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## THE NATURE OF METAPHOR

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Among the mysteries of human speech, metaphor has remained one of the most baffling. No doubt long before Aristotle noted a salient fact or two about metaphor, human beings, in critical mood, considered their odd predilection for asserting a thing to be what it is not.

Current critics and philosophers are still probing the mystery. Mr. I. A. Richards, in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, presents some acute observations on the activity of metaphor. He points out the prevalence and importance of metaphor in human thought and speech. To be sure, he goes too far. He supposes that because words are *formed* by a metaphorical process, they must therefore be *used* metaphorically. He places the source of metaphorical production in the nature of the word rather than in the activity of the mind which uses that word. For example, he thinks that when I speak of the mind seeing something, I must be speaking metaphorically, because the verb "to see" properly belongs to the physical organ of sight. He does not seem to realize that I may, if I choose, make the word express literally the proper act of the mind. This failure to distinguish between the metaphorical foundation of a word and its use in a particular predication has at times unfortunate consequences in critics who follow Mr. Richards in the matter. But, at any rate, Mr. Richards's contention that metaphor is not an ornament added to language, that it is con-

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stitutive, is a notion valuable and necessary to any criticism of human speech and of words constructed with speech.

Mr. Richards attempts also to isolate the elements of metaphor, in the process christening the two objects involved "tenor" and "vehicle." This is a useful beginning, even if one does not care for the terms; misleading terms are better than none. The terms could, indeed, be interpreted to express the definition of metaphor which I shall give. But as presented by Mr. Richards they indicate that two *meanings* are involved in metaphor, one of which carries and modifies the other. To arrive at the nature of metaphor, I contend that one must go beyond meaning to the *being* involved. And it is my aim to prove that only *one* being is involved in metaphor, perceived under a "meaning" which does not really belong to it. The terms I shall use, then, are "an individual being" instead of "tenor," and an "alien nature" instead of "vehicle." My terms might seem to Mr. Richards to be, like Lord Kames's language, "clumsy and distracting"; but I believe that, properly understood, they will express the true nature of metaphor much more exactly than Mr. Richards's terms.

Mr. Richards notes that the two things put together must be in some degree remote from one another. He is pointing to an analogical base for metaphor, a prime consideration in any discussion of the subject. I must quarrel, however, with the notion of putting two things together. My contention is that there is only one *thing* involved in any metaphor. When I say "John is an ox," Mr. Richards thinks that I am putting together two different things, John and an ox. I will attempt to prove that John is the only existing thing here, and that in him I find the nature of an ox. It is up to me to show how I can find in John something that is not really there; and this is what I intend to do. If one granted Mr. Richards's supposition that two distinct things were involved in metaphor, then the mystery of my stating that one of them *is* the other would be totally insoluble.

Mr. Richards's account, though misleading, is useful and suggestive practically. The ultimate causes of metaphor are the concern, after all, of the professed philosopher rather than of the philosophical critic. One contemporary philosopher, Mr. Theodore Meyer Greene, presents a brief philosophical treatment of metaphor in *The Arts and the Art of Criticism*. He takes as his starting point Aristotle's observation that metaphor is "the application of a name or descriptive term to an object to which it is not literally applicable." That is a good starting point, since it is the most obvious of all observable facts

about metaphor. Mr. Greene indicates one of the causes behind this fact when he observes that "metaphorical relation is essentially one of revealing analogical comparison."

Mr. Greene asserts in philosophical terms what Mr. Richards stated in more general terms about the necessary remoteness of the two objects—he, too, supposes that there are two objects—involved in a metaphor. He considers that since two objects are involved in analogy and since metaphor springs from analogy, then two objects are involved in metaphor. I shall attempt to show that while two objects certainly are involved in analogy, only one object is involved in metaphor itself.

In his statement of the analogical nature of metaphor, as he sees it, Mr. Greene makes an observation which, if he perceived its full implications, would furnish a valuable clue to the nature of metaphor. He says, "In literature, analogical comparison is most often made between concrete images and abstract concepts." The "most often" indicates that Mr. Greene perceives no necessary causality at work. And his further discussion reveals that he can find only a verbal difference between metaphor and simile. He therefore adds little or nothing to Aristotle's notation of an obvious fact about metaphor. Philosopher Greene is, it seems to me, even further from the ultimate causes of metaphor than is Critic Richards. And yet upon the philosophers rests the responsibility of furnishing an adequate definition of metaphor.

I am attempting to present a philosophical answer to the question, What is metaphor? An exact definition is not, it is true, at all necessary to a critic. Mr. C. Day Lewis, in *The Poetic Image*, illustrates how well an excellent critic can discuss the thing he knows so intimately without being able exactly to define it. A good farmer, too, can discuss grain from intimate experience and interested observation, without bothering with any exact definition. But a philosopher cannot rest with observation and empirical knowledge. He pushes on in an attempt to discover ultimate causes. Such is my aim.

An essential definition of metaphor should give the Aristotelian material and formal causes—the elements from which it is constructed and the intrinsic force or power which effects, intrinsically, the construction.

In discussing the elements from which metaphor is made, thinkers ancient and modern have emphasized the obvious presence of two elements, since if the word *metaphor* expresses anything about that which it names, it implies two elements at least. Others note the

necessity for more than two elements. Stephen J. Brown, S.J., for example, points out the necessity for considering four terms in the metaphor "Fame is a spur."<sup>1</sup> I think him wrong in stressing four elements in metaphor; and even for simile he stresses the wrong four, I believe. But like all who decide that analogy is the basis of metaphor, he teaches that a metaphor is composed of four basic elements. My own effort in this article will be to establish that there are three basic elements, and only three, involved in every metaphor.

If any reader who has gained an insight into the analogical workings of the mind from analyses like those of Mr. Empson shudders as he reads that last sentence, perhaps he will gain a modicum of reassurance if I state that I am attempting to isolate the essence of metaphor, not to limit its extension into the limitless reaches of being.<sup>2</sup> I am more than willing, too, to admit compoundings and proliferation of metaphor, where more than three elements will enter in. But even those compounds can be broken down into simple metaphors of three elements. It is of the simple metaphor that I speak in this article.

Metaphor is expressed in a variety of ways. I can say "The urn is a bride," "Thou unravished bride," "The urn embraces quietness," and so on. All of these, however, can be reduced to, or are based upon, the proposition that "the urn is a bride." That is necessarily presupposed to the urn's possessing any qualities of a bride or performing any acts of a bride.

Metaphor, then, basically does not say about one thing that it has a quality that belongs to something else, or that it exercises an act which is proper to something else. Basically it says that one thing is another thing. "The urn is a bride."

This apparent falseness has drawn down upon metaphor (and because of it, poetry, in the inclusive sense) the frown of theorists from Plato down to Phelan. Yet those who most effectively attack metaphor


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<sup>1</sup>In *The World of Imagery* (London, 1927), p. 69: "In reality the mind is not simply comparing 'fame' with the concrete object 'spur', and then proceeding to confound the two. What the mind perceives is a resemblance of relations so close as to be practically an equality. Thus:—spur: horse=fame: soul." The mind can construct this equation from an already constituted image, but to start out with such an equation makes a consequent metaphor impossible. This equation necessitates *two* beings, and metaphor can be formed only with *one* being. When I remove the predicate from my metaphorical proposition and give it an existence of its own, then I can form this equation. While I deal with the integral metaphor, equation is impossible because there is only *one* being. The modifications under consideration are those which belong to the alien nature imposed upon the being by the mind. There are literally three terms in metaphor, hence no equation. There are four terms in simile, and two of these can be joined


do so in metaphorical language, for our minds, in dealing with reality, are cabined, cribbed, confined if they cannot breathe metaphorical air.

in the same definition. But the equation of simile would not be that indicated by Father Brown, but something like this:


spur: stimulation :: fame : stimulation  
or, as I would chart it, indicating the three terms of simile,



The three terms of metaphor are really three, because what traditionalists would consider the fourth term is a constitutive part of the alien nature and in the metaphor cannot be considered apart from the nature:



The three terms of simile are really four, but can be considered as three insofar as the two modifications fit the same definition:



In metaphor, the "stimulates" of the alien nature has nothing in it that is not found in the "stimulates" of the being, although the modifications

Metaphor states that the subject of its basic proposition is one with the predicate noun of that proposition. When I say "The urn is a vase," I am stating that the concept in my mind which corresponds to "a vase" is verified in the urn existing ("the urn is") outside my mind. From another angle, I am stating that I have *intellectually* seized the urn, not in its totality, but under the formality of its nature. "John is a man" is the same type of proposition, where I express my apprehension of John under the formality of his nature.

The subject of my proposition exists. The *is* expresses that act of existence. The predicate noun has no extramental existence of its own. It exists only by the *is* of the subject. In other words, the predicate noun, considered as such, represents only a bare nature, a concept abstracted from any really existing thing. *A man*, with

of the being, with its individual characteristics, of course can go beyond the modification as found in the nature. In simile, both modifications are individual, and hence each will show difference as well as similarity. They can never become one, and if one supposes that metaphor too is based on such comparison, he will have to suppose with Father Brown, that we mean only "practically an equality" when we say "Fame is a spur."

Mr. G. P. Henderson, in "Metaphorical Thinking" (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, III [January, 1953], 1-13), is in the same difficulty of being unable to accept fully the predication of a metaphorical proposition. He thinks, too, that the predicate of such a proposition cannot be taken in its ordinary sense, but must mean a relation to some really distinct but mentally unified property: "With simple metaphors, for example, 'John is an obstinate mule', the common property which makes the metaphor possible is obvious: in this case so obvious that often we should not insert the word 'obstinate' at all, but just say, 'John is a mule'" (p. 10). So, he would say, we can achieve this direct predication only by starting with a relation between the two beings and working down to saying one is the other because the common property is so obvious. That, to my mind, is going at the matter backwards, and wrongly. We must start with one being, and deal with a property that is real in the being and verifiable in the alien nature.

<sup>24</sup>In my opinion, it holds good for all images to the extent that every image recreates not merely an object but an object in the context of an experience, and thus an object as part of a relationship. Relationship being in the very nature of metaphor, if we believe that the universe is a body wherein all men and all things are 'members one of another', we must allow metaphor to give a 'partial intuition of the whole world'. Every poetic image, I would affirm, by clearly revealing a tiny portion of this body, suggests its infinite extension" (C. Day Lewis, *The Poetic Image* [London, 1947], p. 29). I agree. If I understand Mr. Lewis correctly, by relationship he refers to individual being as it exists with its real relations to all other beings. Hence by saying, "Relationship being in the very nature of metaphor," he means that metaphors deal with real beings as such. That is what I mean, too, and it is what the traditional Scholastics and some modern critics miss in treating of "meaning," of "concept," of "relation" in the sense of relation between the terms of metaphor. And because metaphor deals with real being, as Mr. Lewis points out, it carries us into the boundless reaches of reality.

the signification which it has in "John is a man," does not exist outside the mind; and in the mind it is not, of course, a man. It is a universal idea, an abstract nature, a thing which can exist outside the mind only by the existence of some subject.

If the abstract nature is really verified in the subject, then my proposition is clearly true. If the abstract nature is not verified in the subject in any way, then such a proposition is certainly false. If it is verified on the basis of a quality or act not proportioned to the subject's own nature, then it is metaphorically true.

For example, "John is a man" is clearly true. "John is an ox" is not clearly true. If I consider it literally, seeking to verify the nature of an ox in John, I will discover that he is a man, not an ox; and hence the proposition is false. If I ask "Why is John an ox?," the answer may be "Because he is strong as an ox is strong." On the basis of his strength, then, which is or seems greater than that which is usual for a man, I can assert that John has another nature to which that strength is proportioned.


If John's strength did not exceed that proper to his own nature, either in fact or in my apprehension, I could not form this metaphor. It is not because he is strong as a man is strong that he is an ox, but because he is strong as an ox is strong.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Metaphors dealing with God, with grace, with immaterial being, present a different angle of our problem from that given when we deal with material beings, which are our proper knowledge in our present state. L'Abbé M. T.-L. Penido in his brilliant book, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris, 1931), expresses this notion well: "La métaphore, c'est, si j'ose dire, comme la revanche de la créature; tandis que les perfections pures conviennent d'abord à Dieu et ne se disent des créatures qu'en dépendance de cet Analogué principal, ici, c'est le contraire qui est vrai. Si, dans l'être, Dieu domine, dans la métaphore, c'est la créature, l'anneau auquel le divin est suspendu" (p. 104). When I speak metaphorically of any immaterial being, I believe it is true to say that I do not indicate any lack of proportion between the nature of that being and its qualities. When I speak of God, I mean that His attributes are more than I can realize or express. If I say "God is a sun," I am saying that God's universal life-giving and life-preserving "functions" are somehow analogous to those of the sun. I am not saying that His effects are not proportioned to Him in reality, but that they exceed what I could have expected. On the other hand, if I say "The president is a sun," I indicate a lack of proportion between the limited nature—the man—and the particular effect; the president is *more* of a distributor of universal benefits than his nature gives me occasion to expect, so I can impose another nature upon him. I cannot in the same way impose another nature upon God. In the case of the president, the nature itself is limited and offers a basis for my intellectual grafting operations. In the case of God, the nature is beyond my grasp and hence does not deny my grafting operations. If I did grasp God, I would be unable to make any metaphor about Him, since His nature offers nothing of the lack of proportion from which metaphor springs.

The quality or act then, upon which the metaphor is built must (1) exist in the subject; (2) exceed or fall below the norm—I perceive it as *not* proportioned to the nature of the subject.

The *matter* from which metaphor is constructed consists of an existing being, a quality or act not proportioned to the nature of the individual in which the quality or act exists, and an alien nature to which that quality or act is proportioned. Those three elements make up the matter for every metaphor.

The form of a metaphor is the mind's predication that alien nature of the existing subject on the basis of the quality or act which exists in the subject and is considered to be proportioned to the alien nature. A diagram of this structure might be made thus:



We say "John is an ox," not "John is the ox" or "that ox." The existing man cannot be the existing ox, of course. One *being* cannot be another *being*.<sup>4</sup> Two subsistent *beings* cannot be predicated directly of one another, but one being can, as it were, assume another nature. John can in a sense exist with both human and ox natures. He can do this, of course, only in the mind of the one constructing the metaphor, not in reality. When I say "John is an ox," he undergoes a remarkable change in my mind, without changing at all in reality. In fact, I emphasize his real individual unchanged self by making the change in my mind.

Our minds operate in the metaphorical mode, I think, because our minds yearn to seize reality intellectually without changing it. To

<sup>4</sup>For example, the theology of the Incarnation stresses this fact. Those theologians who wished to make the union between God and man a union of two *persons* were long ago condemned by the Church. Orthodox theologians argue that two beings can never become one being. They might become a different third thing; but as long as the two continue to exist, their union can never be more than a mere juncture.

However, the Word became flesh, and the resultant *one* being is God and man. This is not contradictory because no human *person* is involved. The person, to whom existence belongs, can exist in two natures and still remain one person. Hence the doctrine of the hypostatic or personal union of two natures in one person avoids contradiction. The human nature of Christ exists by the divine existence as it is proper to the Divine Person.

The Divine Person assumed merely a human nature; He did not assume a man. The Divine Person, after that assumption of human nature, is man as well as God, since by virtue of His human nature He is now a rational animal.

put the paradox bluntly, the mind introduces change in order to avoid change.

The aim of the mind, as I see it, is to seize reality fully. It cannot under present conditions attain that aim, since in order to know material things, the intellect must abstract the intelligible species. Hence the intellect knows a material object, not in itself, but under some formality. That formality limits intellectual knowledge of objects other than itself to something less than intuition. When I say "John is a man," I know John under the formality of his nature. I do not know whether he is black or white.

Metaphor enables us to get the effect of intuition, even though we are actually operating on the basis of abstraction. To say "John is an ox" is not clear in the way that "John is a man" is clear. In order to grasp the metaphor, my attention must be fixed upon the real John in order to see what excessive peculiarity of his makes it possible for him to be known under the formality of an ox. I do not abstract that formality from John himself, as I do when I make the proposition—clear and distinct even if I know nothing else about the individual John—that "John is a man." Rather, in the case of metaphor I impose that formality upon him. Thus I get the effect of intuition, in which I would not change or abstract from John in any way. In metaphor, I seem not to be abstracting, since my predicate noun is not literally in the subject. And yet I have an intelligible statement, which means something to all those who know John, at least those who see him as I see him.

Metaphor is not intuition. It is based upon the mind's normal abstractive process. In order to have the concepts of various kinds of things stowed away in my mind, a great deal of past abstractive process is presupposed. And when I see John as stronger than a man should be, or weaker, I begin diving (so to speak) into my mental depths for a nature to which that strength or that weakness is natural. I can only come up with some nature that exists in my mind, that I have known somehow as connected with such strength or weakness. If I know nothing of elephants, obviously I will never be able to state that John is an elephant. If I know nothing of two-toed sloths, I will not state that John is a two-toed sloth. Yet those might be much more perfect images than any I produce, since John's strength or limpness may be most similar to those produced by the natures of elephants and sloths.


I speak, you notice, of four terms here: John, John's strength, elephant, elephant's strength. And I say that John's strength may be most *similar* to an elephant's strength. One might conclude that

metaphor, like simile, deals with four such terms. That would be, in my opinion, an error which would prevent one from arriving at a satisfactory definition of metaphor.

Metaphor is not condensed simile. They are different kinds of things. Those who look at the matter verbally and note that a tiny word, *like* or *as*, is the only differentiating characteristic of "John is an ox" and "John is like an ox" may be inclined to find minute differences only. Those, however, who consider the matter philosophically will notice that metaphor deals with being and simile with relation between beings. To speak of "condensing" simile into metaphor or of "expanding" metaphor into simile can be justified only on a purely verbal level. It is fatally misleading on any other level.

The metaphorical proposition has one *is*. That indicates that one being is involved. Simile has two *is*'s, since two beings are involved. "John is an ox" discusses only one being, John. "John is as an ox [is]" or "John is as strong as an ox [is]" discusses two beings. In the first simile here, John is presented as being like an ox without specifying in what way, without limiting the comparison. John may be like an ox in one way or in many ways. The second simile limits the comparison to one quality. But the point is that the ox exists as an ox, with its own individual ox qualities and ox acts. In the metaphor, no ox qualities or ox acts other than those included in the *nature* are directly involved. No ox exists other than John.

Diagrammatically, the difference might be expressed thus:



That two *beings* are involved in simile is apparent from the fact that I can say either "John is like an ox" or "John is like that ox." I can never say, however, "John is that ox." The man John could be a real ox only if he could exercise his own act of being so as to exist in two natures at the same time.<sup>5</sup>

I should discuss here what I hold on analogy, since my notion differs in at least one important respect from traditional Scholastic teaching,<sup>6</sup>


<sup>5</sup>In this way the Verbum, by the exercise of His own divine act of existence, does exist in two natures. That is, He is one nature and the other nature exists in Him. The Incarnation could, by analogy, be called an existential metaphor, since God, who alone has control of real existence, does there in reality what men do in their minds—makes one being operate in two natures. It is true to say that in reality Christ is true God and true man. It is also true to say that in my mind, after I have constructed my metaphor, John is true man and true ox. The cases are of course infinitely different, and yet analogous.

<sup>6</sup>The traditional Scholastic teaching may be found most clearly and briefly set forth, perhaps, in Penido's *Le rôle de l'analogie*. Perhaps the point of difference between my view and his might be found in this passage: "La métaphore ne commence qu'au moment où j'appelle le soldat un lion, et l'auto une chenille, car il est par trop clair que la nature du lion et celle de l'insecte ne se retrouve pas intégralement dans le soldat et dans l'auto respectivement, il n'y a de commun qu'un effet semblable. Diversité totale de natures, similitude d'effets, alors certes il y a métaphore et l'un des termes définit l'autre, puisque je ne puis savoir ce qu'est l'auto-chenille si ce n'est au moyen du concept de l'insecte; j'ignorerai ce qu'est le soldat-lion si je ne le vois à travers le courage du fauve" (p. 53). In the sense that I labor in my paper to explain, I do find the nature of the predicate integrally in the subject, so that in my metaphor I create a new being which exists with two natures. Since this unique new creature of mine—and my "auto-chenille" really possesses both natures and not merely "un effet semblable"—is a *being*, it cannot be rationally analyzed. The traditional approach starts with a constituted metaphor, perhaps given by revelation. One examines the terms, and, as I attempt to explain in my paper, that examination leads to misapprehension of the nature of metaphor. One can only see the predicate of a metaphorical proposition in its unique and otherwise contradictory state when it is *in* the proposition. It is only there that it exists by the existence of a being which in *reality* does not operate by that nature. If one will follow the steps by which a metaphor comes into being, as I attempt to do, one will have a better chance of examining the predicate in its native habitat than one has in analyzing a given metaphor. Then perhaps the difference between my definition, based on being, and Penido's, based on relation, will be apparent.

A more satisfactory treatment of a Scholastic understanding of the analogy of being can be found in *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being* by George P. Klubertanz, S.J. (Saint Louis: THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 1952). In regard to metaphor, he says: "We must be careful to distinguish analogy of proportionality from metaphor, for when we speak of 'a smiling meadow' (smile : face :: sunlight : meadow) we are attributing the smile to the meadow, though it is not really, in its proper sense, present there. Hence we can call metaphor a proportional attribution" (p. 44). This is far better than calling it an analogy, and thus the way is left open for my explanation of the reason for such attribution. I

and I have been presuming my notion throughout. It may be that unless I set forth my concept, my discussion will be totally unclear. I hesitate to embark on a sea so rough and so clouded, but the venture seems to me required for those who want to arrive at a definition of metaphor.

Analogy is a likeness between two different beings. Different beings can be alike because of substantial, accidental, or causal likenesses. These likenesses are not exclusive, of course. Two beings can conceivably be alike for all three reasons. For example, a dog and a worm-pill are analogous in that both exist, thus analogous in their substantial being. Or they may both be black, hence analogous in their accidental being. Or they can both be said to be healthy, hence analogous in that one is a cause of health, one a subject of health.



Philosophers differ in their opinions about analogy as a result of differences in their opinions about being. If they hold, as I do, that there is a real distinction between the act of existence and the subject of existence, then they will (or can) admit the analogies I describe, and normally admit another, known as the "analogy" of metaphor. If they hold that the existing subject is absolutely one in reality, their teaching on analogy will be different from mine. They would not say, for example, that the dog and the pill could be analogous on the basis of their existence, since they *are* their existences and they are different. They would hold, too, that the "concept of being" is analogous and thus can be applied to any given being. That appears to me totally erroneous, based as it is on the idea that *being* can be conceived. Their argument would be that if I know a thing, if I make a statement using an intelligible word, I certainly have some concept of it. My idea is that any concept is abstracted from reality, from existence. Hence to have a "concept" of being is totally impossible. A being is known in the judgment, which is not a concept or a juncture of concepts. "John is" expresses the one being, essence and existence. It is this

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
can "attribute" the smile to the meadow, not because there *is* a proportion intrinsic to two distinct beings, but because on the basis of its brightness, I have attributed to the meadow a nature to which *that* brightness I see in the meadow is native. I made the meadow a face; and now it can smile or frown because it *is* a face, and not because it has a relation to another smiling or frowning face.

being which is analogous to other beings. The *is* is not analogous, since it cannot even be considered by itself except in the abstract, where it is "defined" in terms of an order to an essence. It itself has no essence; it is not a being. It can furnish no material for a concept. It is a principle by which a being is, as essence is also a "principle by which." They are not beings, but by them beings are. The way I form a concept is to abstract from real existence and seize what is intelligible to my intellect in its present state. The way I seize reality is to form a judgment in which the total being, not intelligible as such to my intellect, is expressed.

If an *is* should exist, then it would be its own existence. This is true of one being, the Supreme Being, who Is. All other beings, however, are not subsistent *is*, but are other than their own existence. They are composed beings—not composed of two beings, but of two principles which make up one being. It is in virtue of this intrinsic composition that I can have analogy between beings on the basis of the proportion that exists between their existences and their essences. In God this is a proportion of identity, in everything else a different proportion. Thus everything is different, but yet similar in having an intrinsic or proper proportion. Beings—not a concept of being—are analogous. This is, to my mind, the true Thomistic solution to the problem of the one and the many.

Such a proportion of proportions—hence called analogy of proportionality—which is based on substantial *being*, is not in question when we deal with metaphor or simile. That analogy leaves beings in their unique difference from everything else, since the proportion of each is completely proper to it and thus gives no opportunity for the comparison involved in simile—since the two beings are on this basis utterly distinct, not comparable—to say nothing of the identity involved in metaphor.


Let me put the matter in a diagram:



These are alike in having a proportion, yet they cannot be joined in any way. The *is* of one has no application to any other. Every so-called transcendental term—that is, those convertible with *being*, such as "good," "one," "true," and so on—will also offer no basis for mixing. They are *proper* to the subject, not applicable to any other subject under the same formality.

Nor does the analogy based on cause enter in—the so-called analogy

of attribution—for in such a case I am not discussing anything intrinsic to *both* terms. I cannot say that the dog and the pills are similar or the same in that both are healthy, because health is intrinsic only to the dog. To be similar, the common term must be in both.



The quality is *intrinsic* only to the dog. Hence the analogy of *attribution* deals with something intrinsic to one and extrinsic to the other.

Now, what we want for simile is some analogy that permits the different things to be mixed. Analogy of proportionality based on substantial being will not do it because *being* is not a common quality; it is identical with the thing itself—the act of existence and the subject of existence are not separable things, though distinct.


Analogy of attribution does not permit the two to be mixed, either, since the common quality involved is intrinsic only to one member and is extrinsically applied by the mind to the other member. They remain distinct even in the mind.

Hence I arrive at a third type of analogy, which permits mixing of the terms and thus gives me my basis for simile and, remotely, for metaphor. Like the analogy of proportionality based on substantial being, this is based on proportions in each being, but not the proportion between the act of existence and the essence which receives that act. Here the proportion is between the existing essence and some modification, between substance and accident. Hence this analogy is not based on substantial being, but on accidental being. One accident can be conceived as common to several substances (though in *reality*, as distinct from in the *mind*, the accident is merely a modification of the substance, nonexistent apart from the substance). Thus I can speak of accidents as being shared. The dog and the pills can be alike, then, not because they *are* or because they are *healthy*, but because they are *black*. I can say that they share that formality. A similar *is* cannot be said to be in both; a similar *health* cannot be said to be in both; but a similar *black* can be said to be in both. Note once more that I am not saying the one really existing *black* is in both, but that the *black* in my mind, the definition of "black," can be applied to both on the basis of the two *blacks* that are really in them.

This type of analogy could well be called the analogy of simile, since simile is the expression of that analogy. But metaphor has,

actually, nothing directly to do with this analogy—or in fact with any analogy.

The traditional approach to metaphor, expressed in the so-called analogy of improper proportionality, analyzed a metaphor into four elements: the substance to which an accident is formal and another substance to which that accident is not formal (or proper) but attributed. For example, if I say "Grace washes my soul," I analyze the metaphor into water to which the act of washing is proper and grace to which that act is applied because of a similar effect I notice as a result of the proper act of grace.




Because both grace and water act to remove something, I can thus apply *wash*, which is formally in water, to grace, which it is not formally in:



This is the so-called analogy of improper proportionality, an analogy of proportions where the common term is not formally in both subjects. To my mind, this is a chimera. It results, I think, from confusing an abstract analysis with existing realities.

If one would chart the matter thus, I think the matter could be cleared up:



The thing which exists, which is acting, when I say "Grace washes my soul," is grace. What it is literally doing to my soul is cleansing it.<sup>7</sup> In order to express what that cleansing is—a removal of stains—I look for a nature which will fit this cleansing that I (in some way) observe. The nature of grace is obscure to me, but another nature whose cleansing properties has appeared in a thousand cases exists in my mind. I know that the *nature* of water includes the power of cleansing, so that I can apply that nature to this act of grace. Instead of saying that I apply to grace the act proper to water, I say that I apply the nature of water to the act proper to grace. There is a world of important difference.

In the first place, if I approach the matter in the traditional way, I inevitably find myself dealing with two *beings*. Whenever I add a modification to a nature, I also add existence—or rather, the *nature* can only be *modified* when it exists. If a nature acts or possesses

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<sup>7</sup>If I think that grace does not cleanse my soul but merely covers my sins, I will object to the metaphor. My reason for objecting will not concern the washing action proper to water, but the supposed cleansing action in grace. Since I do not find the cleansing action in grace, I will object to the imported nature. I might say, "Grace is not water, but a veil. This is true because it—grace—does not wash, but covers." Notice that my attention is focused always on what *grace* is doing. I do not start with the act of water or the act of a veil and compare that to the act of grace. I start with the act of grace and that remains the only act.

I might also stress again here the essentially unclear nature of metaphor—necessarily so, since it deals with individual being as such, and beings are, as such, never naturally clear to our intellects, either because matter is part of the essence of beings we know or because we have no way of making direct contact with immaterial beings. Metaphor, as intelligible statement, is midway between the direct but nonconceptual contact with reality of "Grace is" and the abstract conceptual clarity of "Grace is a supernatural gift." Metaphor leaves grace in its nonconceptual integrity, but adds the aura of intelligibility by predicating a concept not abstracted from the subject but imposed upon the subject by the mind. The reason for the imposition is in the subject, but I do not know what it is unless the metaphor-maker points to it. If he says, "Grace flows from the divine fountain of mercy," I will make no objection, even if I think grace does not *wash*. This metaphor will be acceptable to both parties, and this may be why grace is water in the mind of the speaker. This is the reason why no argumentation based on metaphor is of any real value, because metaphor takes for granted what it states. It is merely focusing on reality, and if one does not know what it is focusing on, one will never be able to tell from the metaphor itself. One will have to ask the maker or deduce for oneself from an examination of the subject of the metaphor. In the case of "Grace is water" one group of theologians might accept the metaphor because grace rids the soul of sin, while another group, which would reject such a metaphor, could well accept it because grace proceeds from one source and spreads to all who receive it. If the subject with its individual characteristics which is spotlighted by metaphor is not before us, however, the metaphor will never of itself be clear to us.

individual qualities, it must necessarily exist. When I approach the metaphor "Grace washes my soul" by considering that to which this "wash" is proper and decide that this is water, I find myself with water which washes—not only with the power of washing, but really washing, since I am dealing with real "washing" in my metaphor. I have now placed myself in the position of facing a metaphysical difficulty of insuperable proportions. I appear to be saying "This grace is that water." I can avoid the difficulty by saying that metaphor is a fiction, that metaphorical predication is not subject to the laws of predication, that the words I use shift their meanings because of certain relations, and so on. But these answers are hardly worth considering, since the difficulty itself is a false one. It will not come into being if I approach the matter frontwards instead of backwards. If I will realize that it is the subject of my proposition that exists, that if it is operating or existing with acts or qualities which are normally found in quite different beings, then it must somehow share the nature which is the source of those acts and qualities in those different beings. It can share an alien nature in reality only if another nature can be brought under its existence—for example, grace can share the nature of water in reality only if the nature of water could be made to exist by the act of existence proper to this grace. God alone could effect such a thing in reality.<sup>8</sup> But man can

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
<sup>8</sup>This is what the poet *wants* to do too. It is the creative urge in him corresponding to God's creative power. Keats expresses something of this: "The setting sun will always set me to rights—or if a sparrow come before my window I take part in its existence and pick about the gravel," (quoted on p. 67 of Lewis's *The Poetic Image*).

This satisfaction in sharing the existence of another, of acting in its acts, is basic in metaphor too. Here Keats says, "I . . . pick about the gravel," which he can do when he shares the existence of the sparrow. When he says, though, that he takes part in the sparrow's existence, we do not have metaphor, since on the assumption that the two beings are really sharing the same existence, they have become one. It is only when we examine the assumption that we perceive the impossibility. But we see the basis of metaphor here, for if Keats saw something of himself in the sparrow, he could quite truly say, "That sparrow is a Keats," making a nature of himself which he adds to his perception of the individual bird. Or if he saw something of the sparrow in himself, he could say, "I am a sparrow," seeing himself in the light of a new nature. These metaphors would be "created" on the basis not of *shared* existence, but of newly perceived being. And the new being can exist only in the metaphor. If a metaphor were to exist in reality, it would be one person or supposit with two natures, and the conflicts (since the two natures would be *limited*) would be excessive. The Incarnation is possible (in one view of it, at least) because the assuming nature is infinite, and the nature and the Person are identical. Two limited natures, both distinct from their existences, could not be united in one person or supposit without the destruction of some

be a creator, too, in an analogous sense. By the activity of his mind, he can create a new two-natured being which exists only in the mind and can apply a bare nature to the existing act of another being, because the mind conceives of that act as proper to this alien nature. Here, then, I have no more contradiction or real difficulty than I have in the doctrine of the Incarnation. The problem is insuperable only if approached with mistaken presuppositions.

I do not say that an act or quality is applied to another being in an analogous way, as does the traditional approach. I say that the "metaphorical" act or quality of my subject is not *applied*, but is proper to it on the basis of my previous metaphorical proposition. For example, when grace washes, it does so properly because grace is now water. Behind every such "metaphor" dealing with acts and qualities is the basis for it, which is the attribution of a new nature to a being. When I speak of an urn as "the unravished bride of quietness," behind it is the implied statement, "This urn is a bride." Because the urn is a bride it can be unravished or be joined to a bridegroom; because it is this urn and not a real woman, the bridegroom is not a real man but is that which embraces the urn, quietness. This urn is the only thing that exists here, and it can exist in the imagination and intellect of men as it does only because it has acquired a new nature.

This is, as is apparent, not analogy at all. The traditional approach gave four terms, and thus the appearance of an analogy of proportionality. But the "analogous" terms existed in different orders. The one that was "formal" existed, actually, only in the mind; the "applied" one existed in reality:



If such an "analogy" is considered as expressive of reality, the result will be chaos, of course.


Metaphor is not analogy. It is, actually, a denial of all analogy. Metaphor is an assertion of identity, not of likeness but of oneness.

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things intrinsic to one nature or the other. Keats could be a sparrow in reality only at the cost of whatever in sparrow nature contradicts his human nature, since his human act of existence does not embrace all perfection, but only that proper to a man. But in his mind, Keats can extend its reach to include the perfections of an alien nature.


Hence metaphor, based on *being*, treats of one existent. Simile, based on relation between beings, treats of two existents. Analogy, with its four terms, also treats of two existents; and hence analogy is expressed in simile but not in metaphor.

I stated above that if a nature is extrinsically modified, it necessarily exists. Perhaps that statement requires some further discussion. I can mean by "an ox" a bare nature, which has no real existence; and in that case there is no modification in my concept. In predication, such a concept will fit absolutely every ox. When I say "An ox is blocking the road," I have given the concept an act, and only an existing ox can act. "A black ox" is necessarily existent, at least in my imagination if not in reality, since all oxen are not black, and only an existing, limited ox can have an individual quality. Hence in the analogy of proportionality, since each of the main terms has its *own* quality or act, both exist:



To have a simile, it is not necessary that I have an individual existing ox in mind. I can mean "John is like the nature of an ox"; but then I am treating the nature as an existent—a mental existent, of course, but real. It is a *subject*, not a predicate. It exercises an act; it is not a formality under which a being is apprehended. "An ox is" is in a different order from "\_\_\_\_ is an ox." If I compare John with something else, then that something else has an existence apart from John—which is not the case in metaphor.

When the mind, however, finds in one existent (John) a quality or act not proportioned to its nature, above or below the norm, then the mind finds another nature that will fit that one suprahuman or infrahuman quality or act:



Now in my mind John exists with two natures. I can build on this metaphor and refer to both John's natures, revealing their presence; for example, "John is an ox. Watch the ox handling those weights! He'll be in demanding his fodder before long. We're fattening him up for the marriage market." Here John is an ox in the first instance because he is strong. He is a man in demanding, an ox in what he demands. He is a man in being destined for marriage, an ox in being fattened for it. He is operating, clearly, in *two natures*.<sup>9</sup>

I am almost ready now to set down my definition of metaphor; but before I do I want to prevent, if I can, one possible objection made by those who have experienced something of the magic power, the infinite expansiveness of metaphor. My definition has impressed some literary men as too limiting. They misinterpret it, I think, failing to realize two things: (1) that my definition deals with the essence of metaphor and not with possible compounds and ramifications; and (2) that though I state *one* quality or act is of the essence, I do not exclude others. My example in the previous paragraph illustrating

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<sup>9</sup>"Metaphor, we must realize, is a three-cornered relationship. When Ben Jonson called a lily 'The plant and flower of light', he was primarily telling us something about lilies, and secondarily something about light: but also he was telling it in such a way that our own experience of lilies, if the image gets home to us, is enriched. So concentrated is this metaphor that three things—the meaning light gives to lily, the meaning lily gives to light, and the meaning of the lily-light relationship for each reader in the context of the poem—are woven inseparably into one" (C. Day Lewis, *The Poetic Image*, pp. 35-36).

I think that everything Mr. Lewis says here is true and wonderfully revealing. Working with the concrete metaphor, he points out the elements which I isolate for my definition.

If one were speaking philosophically—as Mr. Lewis of course is not—the terms "telling us something" and "gives meaning" would be misleading. In my own terms, I would recast Mr. Lewis's discussion in words far less satisfactory perhaps to achieve his purpose, but more satisfactory to achieve mine. I would say that Jonson, noting in lilies their brightness, ethereality, and so on, accepted those as excessive for a vegetative source, and imposed upon them a new form or life-force. These lilies, now, which exist before Jonson actually (or in his lively imagination), and which must exist too before me (at least in my imagination), have been made to exist (in Jonson's mind and mine) with two natures. They remain flowers, springing from vegetative roots; but insofar as their brightness, ethereality, and so on, are concerned, they now spring, too, from light. These real qualities of the lilies are now more real to us, apparent not only in themselves but spotlighted by a shaft from the alien nature, whose qualities are also stressed in these lilies. Mr. Lewis and I are, I think, in perfect accord here. The only difference we have is, so it seems to me, one of expression. Rather than say, as he does, that the *meanings* are woven into one, I prefer to say that the form of the lilies themselves unites with our concept of light to make up the one new *being* that exists in our metaphor.

the operation of the two natures in one being should make clear, too, that I do not limit metaphor to one quality or act. The point is that there must be at least one. Note, too, that my definition deals with *being*, which is alone satisfactory to the mind. Those who consider metaphor mere fiction, in which the mind does not peer into individual being but rather juggles concepts, are in my opinion dealing not with reality but with the exigencies of faulty reasoning. I consider metaphor as the mind's way of fixing its whole attention upon the peculiar quality of an individual *being*, so that the ultimate limits of metaphor coincide with the ultimate limits of the *being* involved; and who will measure those? Simile is far more limited. It is more clear, because it treats of definite relation between beings. It carries the mind no further than the limits set by the relation or relations which it treats. It has the advantage of clarity, the disadvantage of limitation.

Metaphor is essentially unclear, insofar as purely intellectual knowledge is concerned. If I hear "John is as strong as an ox," I know at once what is meant. If I hear "John is an ox," and the *individual* John with his peculiar characteristics is not present to my eyes or my imagination, I must either assume that the phrase is a cliché referring to his strength or ask, "Why? Is it because he is strong, or plodding, or stupid, or uncomplaining?" If the speaker is an observant man with a mind well stocked with natures, each stocked with its own *proper* qualities and acts, he will possibly mean all of them and others that I never observed until he reveals them to me. But I must keep my eye on John in order to discover what is involved. In simile, I must shift my gaze from being to being in order to discover what relations are possible. In metaphor, I concentrate my whole gaze on one being; and in that individual I discover—not only in the proper light supplied by the being itself but with an added alien light supplied by my own intellect—what further qualities or acts may flow from his newly imposed nature.

When metaphor and simile are confused—which cannot happen by the natural working of the mind, but which does happen in self-conscious efforts to produce a "poetic" effect—then a horrible contradiction offends the mind. For example, in the famous "Trees" of Joyce Kilmer I think the basic difficulty is a confusion of metaphor and simile. The poem is popular, I suppose, because of the good things in it—its simplicity, its appeal to universally attractive comparisons of the tree with a baby and a woman, its reverent and striking comparison between the poet's product and God's—but it is essen-

tially repulsive to many, if not all, professional critics. I believe they perceive in their careful reading of Kilmer's text, that two images collide in the imagination. When Kilmer says

A tree that may in summer wear  
A nest of robins in her hair

I think the careful reader will find himself faced with a choice of a tree with real hair or a woman with a real nest of robins in her hair. The reason is that instead of giving us metaphor, where the real tree would (so to speak) assume the nature of a woman and exhibit its nest like a jewel, Kilmer, by speaking of "her" hair, forces us to picture a real woman too. The "her," which might be generic in referring back to tree, can only be specific in modifying "hair." We can speak of a tree or a ship as "she" without picturing a woman; but we cannot speak of "her hair" without picturing a real feminine subject of *hair*. The tree is presumably acting with the act of a woman, "wears," but it is wearing something proper to a *tree*, not to a woman, so that the *nest* should appear in the tree's leaves and not in the "woman's" hair. If he had said,

A tree that may in summer wear  
A crown of jewels in her hair

the *contradiction*, at least, would be avoided. Or "a nest of robins in its leaves" or even "in its hair," would avoid the contradiction.

The "hair," when it is modified by "her," becomes existent, because only nonmodified hair can remain without determination in time and space. If I said "its hair," I would not be forced to picture a woman as subject of the hair. I could then picture a tree, and its hair would be its leaves, or its branches, or perhaps moss on the branches, or whatever will fit in the tree and picture. Here I must have something that will either support or conceal a nest, so I will construct my picture accordingly.

Kilmer, then, as I read the lines, says, "This tree is this woman," which is a contradiction. If he had said "This tree is a woman," he would have had the material for further metaphors.<sup>10</sup> If he had said "This tree is like this woman," he would have had material for further similes. But unfortunately, he mixes his materials and confounds the mind with contradiction.

This analysis of Kilmer is an attempt to illustrate my principles.

<sup>10</sup>To say "This woman is a tree" would be a different but also an adequate metaphor. One could then say "This woman wears a jewel in her leaves," but not "This woman wears a jewel in its leaves." This last would be the same type of contradiction that Kilmer gives us, reducible to "This woman is this tree."

The difficulty in treating the matter is further evidence of the critical difficulty of dealing with any metaphor. In all such discussion, one tends to conceptualize *being*, which tendency must be constantly resisted. So in an attempt to consider whether Kilmer's predicate is or is not used as an existent, the difficulty is to keep the mind's eye fixed on it as it is in the metaphorical proposition. If we remove the predicate to consider it, it is no longer what it was. If we leave it there, we cannot focus on it.

When the mind finds no difficulty in accepting a metaphor, then one can assume with confidence that the metaphor is what it ought to be. But when the mind experiences difficulty with a metaphorical passage, then one may at least posit a fault in predication and attempt to pin down the slippery specimen for examination. That is all I claim to have done here; and if one suspects that my judgment is faulty, one need not therefore deduce that my principles are faulty.

To sum up, then. For metaphor, the materials are three: an existent subject, an excessive (or defective) quality or act in that subject, and an alien nature to which the quality or act is normal. For simile, the materials are five: two existent subjects, two normal qualities or acts in each, and a relation between the qualities or acts, or between the beings.

The form of metaphor is the identification of the being and the alien nature by means of direct predication on the basis of a quality or act which exists in the being and is proportional to the alien nature but not proportional to the nature of the individual being. The form of simile is the statement of the relationship existing between the two beings involved or between a quality or act in each one.

If one wished to state, for the sake of completeness, the extrinsic ultimate causes of metaphor, I should state them thus: (1) the efficient cause is the human cognitive apparatus—imagination and intellect—which focuses on the concrete subject and forms its direct predication without indicating any abstraction in its metaphorical proposition; (2) the final cause is the attempt of the mind to achieve an approximation of the intellectual intuition of an individual being.

Metaphor, then, is an identification by means of direct predication of an individual being with an alien nature on the basis of a quality or act which is characteristic of the individual as such and of the nature as such. The quality or act, that is, is characteristic of the individual as an individual, but not conceived to be characteristic of the *kind* of thing it is. The same quality or act is in general characteristic of the alien nature, but obviously not characteristic of any

individual really existing with that alien nature.

Metaphor, unlike simile, does not exist in the conceptual and intelligible order of literal statement and comparison. Metaphor exists only in the concrete and nonconceptual order of real being. Critics who do not realize this think that in dealing with metaphor the mind is free to roam in the ambiguous realm of concepts, whereas in fact the mind dealing with metaphor is bound to the dynamic intransigence of real being. In simile, the mind may swing to any relation that can be established between the beings involved. In metaphor, the mind is motionless and speechless in its vital and profound contemplation of being. The critic may usefully lay bare the elements of metaphor, but he can neither conceptualize nor speak the reality which metaphor alone darkly expresses. Except for metaphor, the mind in its present state is helpless to express what

Nor mouth had, no nor mind expressed,  
What heart heard of, ghost guessed. . .

My aim has been to define metaphor and in so doing to reveal it as the expedient of the human mind in attempting to express the inexpressible. Metaphor is not analogy, but in a sense the destruction of analogy by the activity of the mind. Metaphor deals not with the conceptual and clear, but with dynamic being, necessarily obscure to our abstractive intellects. It expresses in a dark manner those sidelong glimpses of real being with which our yearning intellects must be satisfied until they are filled with the light of Being Himself.

# PARTICIPATED UNDERSTANDING: THE THREE ACTS OF THE MIND

QUENTIN QUESNELL, S.J.

In the Thomistic hierarchy of being, multiplicity is the characteristic of that which is lower. A perfection possessed by a higher being in a simple fashion is possessed by a lower as multiple. The lower being does by steps and degrees what the higher can accomplish in a single and simple operation.

The manner in which this general principle works out and is exemplified in the field of intellectual knowledge is of considerable interest, and its study is of real value for those interested in St. Thomas's psychology of the human intellect.

If we are to enter into this matter to any depth, we must begin, with St. Thomas, by gazing upon the universe as a whole, in all its graded perfection.<sup>1</sup> At the top, of course, we find God; after Him, the highest of all the angels; then the next angel, the next, and so on down to the lowest. At the bottom of the intellectual hierarchy, and at the top of the material world, we see man, and, below man, the world of the merely material.

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<sup>1</sup>One must understand, of course, that the method of exposition employed in the first part of this article is practically the reverse of the method of invention actually used by St. Thomas in his study of the human intellect. That is, St. Thomas does not deduce the nature of the intellect from its place in the hierarchy of being; rather, he gives the human intellect its place in the hierarchy only after its nature and properties have been determined. Moreover, St. Thomas does not reason from an abstract notion of understanding in general to the nature of human understanding; rather, he builds up his notion of understanding in general from his analysis of human understanding, its essential nature, and its nonessential imperfections.

In other words, the method of exposition here employed is nothing more than a method of exposition. It is an easy, summary sketch of the background against which St. Thomas pictures human understanding as taking place, and therefore it is a useful introduction to the descriptive processes and reasoning which follow in the latter part of the article.

Now to clarify the exact point of our inquiry, let us make use of a little trick St. Thomas himself sometimes uses.<sup>2</sup> Let us create for ourselves an imaginary universe, one of those much-talked-about possible universes. Let us imagine a universe in which everything remained just as it is in this dull world, with the one small exception that man, or rather human souls, would exist without bodies.

Now, let us single out for consideration the intellectual hierarchy in this possible universe. The intellectual hierarchy extends, as it does in the real world, from man at the bottom, its lowest representative, to God at the top, as always, perfection's most perfect manifestation.

Let us look into what precisely is meant by calling this group of beings "intellectual." The faculty of intellect, the ability to understand (*intelligere*) is a (simply) simple perfection. Therefore, it is found perfectly only in God; it is found participated in varying degrees by all other members of the group, more or less perfectly according to each one's greater or less closeness to the divine exemplar and cause of all.<sup>3</sup>

Intellectuality is, for all beings less than God, a compensation of a sort for their essential limitation.<sup>4</sup> Finite existents cannot have all the perfection of all being substantially; so, by a sharing in this divine power, they are enabled somehow to possess the perfection of all being accidentally.<sup>5</sup> They are enabled, by their power of understanding, to make their own and take unto themselves the existential perfections of others as other, and so become, in a way, infinite themselves.

When they perform the act of understanding, they penetrate, by means of a certain spiritual light, the innermost realities of the things about them; they seize, grasp, and make their own other beings in their existential fullness and otherness. They understand other things fully; that is, they know what things are. And this is not a knowing "what things are" as distinct from a "that they are." No, in its fullness, this knowledge of what things are includes things as existing, as acting, as accidentally modified in various ways. For beings really are existents, agents, and accidentally modified. And in the power to understand is included and implied the power to grasp all these aspects of reality.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup>ST, I, q. 84, a. 4; q. 89, a. 1, etc.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., q. 55, a. 3, etc.

<sup>4</sup>De Ver., q. 2, a. 2.

<sup>5</sup>CG, II, cap. 46; III, cap. 17-22.

<sup>6</sup>ST, I, q. 55, a. 1, etc.

Moreover, this grasping of others in understanding them is, of its nature, something simple.<sup>7</sup> The knower, qua intellectual, has merely to look and the object is his in its fullness and reality. A simple acceptance of another—that is what understanding, *intelligere*, is in its essence according to St. Thomas.

This perfection is, however, as we were saying, participated in various ways. God, in His very essence and His existing, possesses simply all things that He has made.<sup>8</sup> And, of course, for God, this power and act of understanding is no compensation for limitation, but a necessary prelude to the existing of all other things.

In the highest angel the intellectual light and power are, to say the least, considerably less than the intellectual power of God. Moreover, the angel cannot know all things as actually present in his own essence, for all things are not present there. The angel is limited.<sup>9</sup> This angel, then, understands and possesses things only in similitudes of the things themselves. These similitudes are the species infused into the angel by God. We ordinarily conceive of them as derived from the exemplars through and in which God makes the things He creates. The species are partial glimpses, therefore, of the divine essence, which present things created in their existential totality and all at once, for they present things “from the side of the *esse*” the way God knows and creates them.

In a few such species, the highest angel knows all the reality below him perfectly, for, by his tremendous intellectual light, he can penetrate into these few species and see all their implications of individuals under them, the possible actions of these individuals, and all their possible accidental modifications.

The reality which is above himself—God—the angel knows in a different way.<sup>10</sup> (This is by nature, not by grace.) For there can be no created species representative of God in any adequate manner; and, even if there could be something of the sort, it could never be contained in the intellect of an angel. No lower being is able to take perfectly and receive as subject the proper perfection of a higher. How then does the highest angel know God? By analogy. Analogy with what? With the one object in the universe perfectly proportioned to his intellectual grasp and to himself; the only reality which is on exactly the same level of existential perfection as himself—his own

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., q. 79, a. 8; q. 58, aa. 3 and 5.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., q. 14, etc.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., q. 55, aa. 1 and 2, etc.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., a. 1 ad 2; q. 56, aa. 2 and 3, and ad 1.

substance. Looking into his own substance, grasping himself as object intellectually, he can see in himself and in his own essence and *esse*—still by a simple gaze—something of what He who made him must be.

The knowledge of the second highest angel is roughly the same as the knowledge we have just been sketching, with the exception that this lower angel requires a greater number of infused species in which to know. This is necessary because the lower angel's intellect possesses a less powerful intellectual light and so is unable to penetrate a given reality as deeply as can the higher. If the lower angel received only the same number of species as the higher angel with which to attain knowledge of all things below him, his knowledge would remain forever confused and general.

In this same fashion, all the way down through the remaining members of the intellectual hierarchy, each intellectual being requires a greater and greater number of intelligible species to enable him to know the reality which is below him in the scale of being. Also, in the same fashion, each one knows the things above him by the respective relations (either of cause or of quasi-generic community) these things have with his own substance.

If, now, we descend the hierarchy, all the way down to the last and lowest representative of this power of intellection, we come to the human soul.<sup>11</sup> Remember, now, we are imaginatively making this soul exist alone, separated from any body. This soul is at the very bottom of the intellectual hierarchy. And so, following the requirements of any really good hierarchy, it possesses the absolute minimum of intellectual power which any being can possess and still deserve to be called a member of the hierarchy.

With so feeble an intellectual light, the soul, if it is to know the things below itself clearly, will need a separate infused species for every single thing it is to know. For, being at the bottom of the hierarchy, it will not have at all the power to see individuals within large, general species. Thus it will need a separate creative species for every existing individual below itself, as well as for every accident, action, and change in every individual, if it is ever to gain knowledge of all these things. Without such an elaborate arrangement, its knowledge must remain forever hopelessly confused and general.

(This is not yet the whole story.<sup>12</sup> As a matter of fact, there prob-

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 2; q. 89, a. 4.

<sup>12</sup>The fact is clear that St. Thomas insisted that the simple grasp of a separated human intellect was too feeble to be worth much. My account of the reasons for its impotence is only one suggested explanation. More com-

ably would never be creative species for accidents, actions, changes, and so on. God, after all, creates substantial existents. The accidental modifications which follow upon that creation and the actions which beings perform are produced by, and flow from, the substantial act of existing given by God. They are dependent upon God, are reducible ultimately to His creating hand; true; but they are so reducible and dependent through the substantial *esse* which is truly the *esse* of the thing created. God does not directly create all these things; and so, in all probability, there is no such thing as a creative species in which to see them separately posited. If a given intellect is not strong enough to see them in the species of the substantial existent himself, then that intellect must, if it is to have knowledge of these things, receive knowledge of them in some other way.)

Thus we see the situation of the human soul as a separated substance to be rather a desperate one. For, the things above itself it can know only by a remote analogy with itself; and the things below itself it can know only in a confused and general, weak and imperfect fashion. This is necessarily the case of the human soul if it is to participate in the perfection of understanding as a separated substance. For, in that state, all it can do is look simply upon its object; and what it cannot get from such a simple look, it cannot get at all.

Fortunately, however, this is only an imaginary universe we have been discussing, and the human soul was never put into such an awkward situation. Instead, extremely fortunately, the human soul, with its intellect, was made the form of a body.

How does this improve its situation? In two ways, chiefly. The soul, first of all, can now work in conjunction with lower powers, powers that are grounded in body and soul together. With the aid of these powers, the intellect receives intelligible species for the act of understanding directly from the things themselves; and so it can make direct contact with individual existing things through the senses and imagination, thus coming to know them as existing and as individual.<sup>13</sup>

Is the soul's intellectual light stronger in a body? Is its glance more penetrating than it would be in the possible world? Not at all. Its first simple acceptance of a thing—the equivalent in this state of the simple participation in understanding that we spoke of previously

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monly this weakness is explained simply by the fact that the human intellect is purely in potency to begin with. Such an explanation seems inadequate, however, for it fails to rule out the possibility of God or an angel supplying the intellect with species one at a time.

<sup>13</sup>ST, I, q. 84, aa. 4, 7, 8; q. 86, a. 1, etc.

—is, if anything, weakened. For now the soul's glance does not rest on a creative species and so approach its object “from the side of the *esse*,” the existential actuality, but rests rather on the thing itself only insofar as it is affecting the soul by acting on the body and therefore only as having a nature and essence—from the existentially potential side.<sup>14</sup>

This simple glance the soul still has is now called simple apprehension, and, as in our imaginary separated state, it still does not penetrate very far into the existential fullness of the things known. It remains simple and weak and poor. It does not give us much possession of the things to be known; it barely touches their surfaces. It is the act we call simple apprehension.

But—and this is the second significant difference—now, with the aid of the lower powers, the intellect's action need not stop with this simple glance, this first understanding which tells us what a thing is in the most imperfect manner possible.<sup>15</sup> Now, because of being in a body and able to work with senses and imagination, our intellect is able to compensate for its imperfect participation in understanding by performing other acts besides simple understanding. Our intellect is able now to judge and to reason; that is, it is able to progress from one understanding to another, to affirm and know that things exist, to know things—by judgment—in their singularity and activity, as they really are.

By these means, by several understandings of the same thing, by a comparison of understandings, by movement of understandings, by reflection and return to the activity and passivity of lower powers, the soul comes to build up for itself an understanding roughly and analogically equivalent to the understanding the more powerful intellects gain in their one simple glance. By adding to its own first glance all that reflection, judgment, reasoning can give, the soul proceeds to a new simple grasp, an understanding of what the things are, which leaves out nothing whatsoever and which, intrinsically complex and therefore not so simple, is an acceptance and possession of the perfections of other beings as other; a clear and distinct intellectual knowledge of reality as it is.

Moreover, let us recall, these further acts are to understanding as motion is to rest.<sup>16</sup> They are not understanding itself. Yet, we must insist, they are acts of the same power, the same faculty of the

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 5.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 89, a. 5; q. 84, aa. 7 and 8.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 79, a. 8.

soul. They are acts of that faculty, however, not by reason of what the faculty is in itself—for that same faculty in the angels, for example, does not move; in the separated soul after death it does not and cannot move—but by reason of that faculty's belonging to a soul which is here and now the form of a body.

The simple act which is called understanding is the act of that faculty considered in itself. It is the only act of that faculty when separated from the body. It is, even in the other intellectual acts which the soul performs in the body, that part of those acts which belongs to the intellect of its own nature as intellect, and not because of its being a particular kind or level of intellect. The other acts—judgment and reasoning—are acts of an intellect which is joined with a possible and mutable element, the human body.<sup>17</sup>

This first act of understanding, or simple apprehension, remains in us always a poor thing at best. Instead of grasping all the reality of a thing, as does the equivalent simple act of understanding in angels or God, it grasps only the essence, the whatness, in the sense of the existential potentiality of the thing. This first contact does not give a grasp of the existential act. This is an understanding of a sort, true enough. It does give a whatness of the object. But so poor an understanding is it that our intellectual faculty cannot possibly rest content with it or consider itself to have reached a true term of operation in so feeble an apprehension. Our intellect must search further, and it always does. With the aid of the lower powers of the man, here and now in contact with outside reality, the intellect judges this first attained whatness to exist. Then, reflecting on this, its existential judgment, it realizes that what it has attained and is in contact with is a being. Now it first understands its object in anywhere nearly a perfect manner. Here it has reached a true term. In

<sup>17</sup>Cf. for example *ibid.*, q. 84, aa. 7 and 8; q. 85, a. 5; q. 89, a. 5.

<sup>18</sup>To speak of the intellect defining its object as a being is not to return to the concept of being as a form or to deny that the existential judgment is the key to man's grasp of that which is. This will be clear if we now run through briefly the various steps involved in the intellect's coming to know a single object.

a) The intellect first makes contact with an outside existent in the first act of the mind, the simple apprehension, when the mind is informed by a whatness (quiddity), impressing itself on the mind through the body by reason of the action of an external object. (Let us leave undetermined the question of how conscious this first step may be.) At once the intellect responds to the call of being from without.

b) Acting in conjunction with lower powers, the intellect makes an existential judgment: "Something (the received whatness) exists." This is the second act of the mind, judgment.

this first "definition" it can rest.<sup>18</sup> But, driven by the craving of its own nature, it does not usually rest very long. It goes on further to possess the thing it is knowing still more completely. Thus it proceeds to investigate more fully what this being is that it is at present imperfectly understanding. Again it seeks for a further and fuller grasp of what this thing is. This it does by compositions and divisions, reasonings, and consequent further and further and fuller and fuller understandings.

Does the human intellect in this way ever reach a term of complete and perfect satisfaction in the full, conscious, simple possession of any being? Probably not. But, considering its place in the hierarchy of intellects, this is in no way surprising. What it has and can attain is very good, everything considered. Anything further can well await the future happier day when by God's bounty transformed nature will reach beyond itself and its own poor limitations to a manner of knowing which will truly be divine.

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c) The intellect answers for itself its own constantly recurring and characteristic question, "What is this?", with the definition, "This is a being." As a definition, this is a return to the first act of the mind, apprehension. But this is, let us note, no longer a *simple* but a *complex* apprehension. That is, this apprehension—namely, being—contains two distinct elements separately attained—a determined whiteness, attained in apprehension, and a concrete act of existing, attained in judgment. But these two elements are fused by the intellect in a spiritual approximation of the manner in which they are fused in reality, and they are held for inspection by the intellect simultaneously and as one composite. What was separately attained is now recomposed—without the distinct elements becoming confused—in the complex apprehension.

d) The mind makes further simple apprehensions about the same being: apprehensions of whiteness, squareness, and so on.

e) These apprehensions are immediately incorporated into concrete judgments and definitions: This is white, this is square, and so on.

f) The mind may then reason on these judgments already attained; or it may simply add judgments and apprehensions together until they can be fused again into a higher unity: "This is," for example, "a large white rectangular being used for writing." Or perhaps into a still more compact unity: "This is a piece of typing paper." The process of arriving at these higher unities and more complex apprehensions is called the third act of the mind, reasoning.

g) The finished, final definition is again a return to the first act of the mind, another complex apprehension.

Thus everything begins with, and returns to, the first act of the mind, apprehension. This is the act called "understanding" throughout this article. Understanding (*intellectus*) is St. Thomas's most frequently used name for it. This is for him the most proper act of the faculty also called understanding or *intellectus*. It is easy to see why, provided only that one avoids conceiving this act in too narrow and limited a fashion.

# GABRIEL MARCEL: THE RECOVERY OF BEING

ROBERT OSTERMANN

## I

At this point we could scarcely wish to disagree with Gabriel Marcel that a philosophy stopping at what he calls objectivity (our philosophies of essence) is in the proper sense of the word no philosophy at all; it betrays man by excluding him from its rigid rational calculations. Man—more specifically human personality—is the key to an authentic ontological understanding of the world; he alone can correct the ravages worked by a distorting knowledge. It is almost as if personal rectitude would have to be the principal requirement; but Marcel is too thoughtful to slip into this dangerous conclusion. The distinction between practical and speculative, while never expressly formulated, exercises a saving persuasion. The correction is begun with a reassuring objectivity (in the Thomist sense).

The philosopher is confronted at the outset with a minor paradox<sup>1</sup> that every thinking person must meet. He is about to institute an inquiry into the roots and justification of human knowledge; he prepares to seek its authority. But it would seem impossible to do this without first arriving at a position prior to knowledge, which is ridiculous. How can he seek the beginning of something that he must have in order to begin his search? What may be called our “interior mobility,”<sup>2</sup> a kind of indetermination whose result is a transcendence (amongst other things) of our state, raises the philosopher from his dilemma. He is within *and* without; he has a power of self-observation which does not objectify the self observed; he is not bound or fixed,

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*This is the second article on Gabriel Marcel by Mr. Robert Ostermann. The first appeared in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN for January (Vol. XXXI, 99-116).*

<sup>1</sup>Cf. Marcel, *Etre et avoir* (Paris: Aubier, 1935), p. 183.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (“The Gifford Lectures.” Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951), I, 162-71. My life “eludes me and indeed, in all directions, eludes itself.”

because our human locale is not alone a matter of space. So that, as we shall subsequently see, by verifying the beginning of the quest, the end has been foreshadowed. It is on the bases of man's peculiar prerogatives, his superiority to limiting confines, that we have hitherto been able to make (accompanying Gabriel Marcel) an effective description of the error responsible, its characteristics, and the lineaments of the world this error ignores or betrays.

Now because it signifies a science, epistemology is a word Marcel deplores; science is a thing of techniques,<sup>3</sup> and a science of knowledge is an absurdity for him. Disputes over words aside, our problem is an epistemological one.<sup>4</sup> We know by experience that we are past objectivity; we are in the metaproblematic; we defy the dehydrated abstract order. How do we validate this knowledge? We know that reality is stifled in objectivity, is not itself. Hence if objectivity is the result of thought, the question remains: How is reality contacted and known? Isolating the critical problem, Marcel wrote in April, 1914: "Comment une justification est-elle possible de ce qui par définition prétend transcender toute réflexion?"<sup>5</sup>

A slight recapitulation of a basic theme is here essential. In a discussion of metaphysical optimism and pessimism, whose contents form but one part of that huge network of trails being meticulously laid down towards the later definitiveness we have been considering, we find it explicitly emphasized that "there is no objectively valid judgment bearing upon being."<sup>6</sup> Optimism and pessimism are both in error because they claim to be able to formulate judgments on the content of reality *posed as an object of knowledge*. This is contradictory: the object is that which does not exist.<sup>7</sup> We cannot speak objectively about being.

The context of this argument is unimportant; its significance is to bring us face to face with the gulf between existence and objectivity. The objective is here, as always, the order of universality, if ob-

<sup>3</sup>*Etre et avoir*, pp. 281, 182.

<sup>4</sup>We would not deny imposing here an organization and order on Gabriel Marcel's work which is only implicit in it. He is a voyager; his mission is discovery and transmission. But we suggest that this is precisely the order he would himself propose, were he not prohibited by method and inclination from so doing. None of his connections have been violated; we have tried to select and arrange in order to express the undisclosed unity. Doubtless we have plotted the march. Nevertheless the march was, in the beginning, made by him.

<sup>5</sup>*Journal métaphysique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), p. 99. Cf. p. 65: "il n'y a de jugement possible que sur l'essence."

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>7</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 7.

jective be "pris au sens de ce qui vaut pour une pensée en général." Conditionally, or at any rate at this stage of the discussion, universality can be found encased in the *cogito*, in the *je pense* which is abstract thought.<sup>8</sup> This is but one halting place amongst many. Though the terminology varies and the exposition often changes speed and emphasis, the burden of every approach is to set out challengingly the necessity of penetrating beyond objectivity into a domain where the classical relation between subject and object fails to apply.<sup>9</sup> This "beyond" also bears the instructive title of *invérifiable absolu*,<sup>10</sup> which is identified in these entries with liberty.<sup>11</sup> From our advantageous historical location certain convergences can be seen that will help relieve the load of detail. This *invérifiable absolu*, and by transposition what is constantly referred to as *l'ordre de la liberté*, is no other than the existential side of reality unattainable by verifying thought; because verification occurs at the level of the object and liberty is that sovereign mark of independence by which man mounts over his own limitations.<sup>12</sup>

We ought not be disconcerted by the multiplicity of avenues nor misled by their diversity: dialectic, faith, sanctity, miracles, religious history, appearance and reality; their abundance shows the force of Marcel's conviction that there has been a disastrous omission from human experience and knowledge. He admits<sup>13</sup> the presence of uncertainties and hesitations; his own work is not untainted by the enemy he repudiates. Nevertheless there are pathways—underground, perhaps, and breaking surface only occasionally—which unite this multiplicity. One such leads directly to the heart of any theory of knowledge; namely, to its origins, to the senses. The passage is of capital importance, so we translate it in full:<sup>14</sup>

I will call this position [a direct contact of something with a part of my body, spoken of a few paragraphs earlier and called *position d'un existant*] in the future *expérience-limite*; and I will say that this can only be thought by a reflexive act bearing upon the dualism of the judgment of existence and that which the judgment bears upon. This limiting experience, insofar as

<sup>8</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 34-46, 67-73.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 315.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 28-32.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 31. Cf. Etienne Gilson (ed.), *Existentialisme chrétien* (Paris: Plon, 1948), p. 153.

<sup>12</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 119-20. Cf. *Du refus à l'invocation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), pp. 11, 78-79.

<sup>13</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, introd., pp. ix-x.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

the reflecting subject claims to disengage it from the objective content, is reduced to a contact between the body linked to the perceiving consciousness and an exterior datum. Reflecting thought poses therefore the judgment of existence as a transposition into the intellectual order—where there are objects and judgments bearing on these objects—of the limiting experience; and this is valuable for any judgment of existence whatever it might be. From this point of view we see how nothing can be said to exist except what can enter into relations of contact, spatial relations, with my body.

And where there is no direct contact, “there is a construction of a state of consciousness which would correspond to the contact.” The kernel of a complete epistemology is set therein. The directness, the immediacy of the contact is pivotal: “Consider being as attested, the senses as *witnesses*.<sup>15</sup> And flying instantly to the highest level, but only to illustrate the continuity of the doctrine: “Would it not be the essence of anything ontological that it can be no more than attested?”<sup>16</sup> To witness is not to specify or determine or characterize; in the widest sweep of the term it is coincident with the province of experience;<sup>17</sup> and so we are back once more at our earliest notion of a *rencontre*. And we are also determinedly realist.

There is a false dilemma,<sup>18</sup> writes Marcel, a residue of idealist authority, that vitiates every attempt to justify something indubitable, a living human knowledge. The alternatives have always been: (a) a pure empiricism; (b) a reason which finds its content in itself and unreels *une chaîne de propositions* from an initial truth by a process whose springs are solely its own internal spontaneity. How plausible, too, it all seems, the rationalistic mechanism; but with one splendid stroke the structure is toppled and a vindication of realism begun: “Il faut admettre que la pensée (la raison) ne se constitue comme pensée pour elle-même qu’au fur et à mesure qu’elle se réalise dans l’expérience,”<sup>19</sup> and not in any psychological sense. The hypothesis of a thought anterior to *all* experience is clearly absurd, *une pseudo-idée*. If we separate thought and experience, objects they become; a dynamic moment is arrested and falsified. Thought can only know and seize itself in experience, which is to sink a deep foundation for the subsequent erection of a theory now more positive than disputative. It begins with sensation, where experience begins, and the trail

<sup>15</sup> *Etre et avoir*, p. 139.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.

<sup>18</sup> *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

is unmistakably marked from there to the human person who, as elsewhere, occupies and is occupied by the centre of the stage.

## II

Every philosopher must begin with a fact, unless he is in some unimaginable way to precede himself as an existing being. Sensation is a fact, even if we should decide to give it another name; and our difficulties commence when we try to determine its true nature. We have seen how, in a different context, the body is not an instrument of the soul.<sup>20</sup> It is also certain that sensation cannot be considered as the transmission of a message, the opinion generally held of it, for every message presupposes a sensation and we are right on the way to infinity.<sup>21</sup> In other words, for the emission from the object sensed to be converted (*translated* is Marcel's word) into the language of the senses a prior datum is required, just as a cryptographer needs a code; and of course we do not have this in the case of sensation. Sensation can no more be treated as message than the body can be treated as instrument; the second implies the existence of a body which is not an instrument (and by what right do I assert this?). In the first I would have to spring outside of what I am in order to see if, before reaching me, the unknown which becomes a sensation in me were already a sensation. Hence to sense is not to receive, but to participate immediately.<sup>22</sup> It is important to note that we have reached exactly the same position as in the discussion of existence and objectivity; namely, an undetailed immediacy which for existence is a massive or global assurance<sup>23</sup> of the world as existing and for sensation, the immediate participation of the subject in an ambiance from which no real division or border separates it.<sup>24</sup>

Ignoring the admitted incompleteness of the argument thus far, for the purposes of emphasis and exposition it is convenient to make a radical leap and approach this, as yet, unexplored center from the opposite direction—from the side of the intellectual operations of thought. Thought objectifies, contracts, and freezes attention upon the object known (apparently) as quite outside thought; it divides, scatters, interrupts. At this point an important intervention occurs,

<sup>20</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 225, 322-24.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 250, 317-19; *Reflection and Mystery*, trans. by G. S. Fraser. Vol. I of *The Mystery of Being* ("The Gifford Lectures." 2 vols. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951), pp. 105-8.

<sup>22</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 251.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 313, 314.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 322.

and we recognize that this morcellation is inconsistent with the real situation of things. Thought is not radically cut off from things; things are not radically cut off from one another; mystery is asserted. It is as if I were possessed of an intuition, benefited from it, all without knowing immediately that I did possess it<sup>25</sup> and without apprehending it as such.<sup>26</sup> We may call this, though not with complete satisfaction, *intuition réflexive*,<sup>27</sup> by which is implied that my position face-to-face with being—a kind of intuition—is only grasped through “les modes d’expérience sur lesquels elle se réfléchit et qu’elle illumine par cette réflexion même,”<sup>28</sup> as it were tracing to its cause this flush of life in our knowledge. Marcel calls this first kind of thought primary reflection,<sup>29</sup> which disrupts the unity of the experience presented to it. Man’s recollective capacity is the ground of this illusive “intuition” which is completely attained, with all its values articulated, in a secondary reflection, “une réflexion à la seconde puissance;”<sup>30</sup> the intuition, otherwise lost as it is exercised,<sup>31</sup> is recovered and secured; thought “stretches out” towards its recovery.

In order to accomplish this, primary reflection has to be negated; that is to say, the dialectic or discourse between the mind and objects (imagine a horizontal movement) must be crossed and overcome by a transcendence (imagine a vertical movement) so that a genuine progress may be won over the sealed-off repetitiveness of objectivity. This is not the false Hegelian progress contained within a perfectly functioning systematization;<sup>32</sup> “c’est le progrès d’une réflexion qui transcende ses propres positions.” As Madame Delhomme has well seen,<sup>33</sup> “thought refuses to identify itself with the objectively known in virtue of its own transcendence in regard to this object.” Reflection is at once the particular moment and the power rising over that moment;<sup>34</sup> and it is out of this basic assurance that the full doctrine of secondary reflection emerges.

<sup>25</sup>*Etre et avoir*, pp. 170-71.

<sup>26</sup>*The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. by Manya Harari (London: Harvill Press, 1948), pp. 13-14.

<sup>27</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 141.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>29</sup>*Reflection and Mystery*, p. 83. Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 3-4: “L’acte par lequel la réflexion se définit comme telle . . . est celui par lequel la conscience se pense comme empirique.”

<sup>30</sup>*The Philosophy of Existence*, p. 14; *Etre et avoir*, p. 171; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 77-103. Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 67-73, 12-13.

<sup>31</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 171.

<sup>32</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup>*Existentialisme chrétien*, p. 141.

<sup>34</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 71-72.

Thought is concerned to regain itself, to appreciate its properties and hidden forces. Primary reflection breaks up the massive, instinctive existential experience, produces discontinuities where there was the "global" immediacy. For this reason secondary or recuperative reflection, trained on the disjointed determinations of abstract thought or primary reflection, ought be considered as "philosophy itself in its specific effort of restoring the concrete;"<sup>35</sup> it is the "special high instrument of philosophical research."<sup>36</sup> The sterile dialectical rhythm is invigorated and taken out of itself. We are at the source of dialectic; or, in another way, we are at the positive act in terms of which all positivity is to be defined.<sup>37</sup> We can hymn this supreme act in many ways, but its most perfect note is that by it we are in the realm of the spirit;<sup>38</sup> we have left behind mechanisms and techniques, the debilitating equipment of the scientific mind. And in another significant return, it becomes certain that reflection (secondary) has as its animating spirit a familiar and fundamental truth, the metaphysical unease or dissatisfaction that is in man a veritable appetite for being.<sup>39</sup> How could the mind be other than dissatisfied with the shattered functional world given in primary reflection? It has had an acquaintance with unity prior to primary reflection. Is it not back to this original perfection that secondary reflection returns it?

A convenient example will perhaps clarify the role and importance of this recuperative act. In the question—"Am I my body?"—and in its affirmative answer, Marcel employs primary and secondary reflection.<sup>40</sup> Considering my body as an instrument or as the object of various scientific disciplines like anatomy, physiology,<sup>41</sup> and so on, it becomes in no way different from other bodies and shares with them verifiably identical characteristics. For all practical purposes of experimentation and study this body is "nonprivileged," an object of a quite detached scrutiny which exemplifies the scientific temper at its highest and noblest point.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless I continue to persevere in the conviction that this is not the whole of the matter; in spite of the surety of the evidence it does seem that this relationship of body and me is inadequate. Right here secondary reflection re-establishes

<sup>35</sup> *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 34.

<sup>36</sup> *Reflection and Mystery*, p. 83.

<sup>37</sup> *Etre et avoir*, p. 170.

<sup>38</sup> *Reflection and Mystery*, p. 215.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 215. Cf. *Etre et avoir*, p. 177.

<sup>40</sup> *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 92-102; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 322-29.

<sup>41</sup> *Reflection and Mystery*, p. 92.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 215-16.

in its continuity "le tissu vivant qu'une analyse imprudente avait disjoint;"<sup>43</sup> "my-body" is necessarily prior, this reflection declares, to any scientific or disinterested dismemberment of its unity. Relevant to our exposition, it is important to keep in mind that secondary reflection does not contradict the propositions of a primary reflection. The dialogue of scientific, objective, technical knowledge is authentic, but its incompleteness encourages fearsome abuses.<sup>44</sup> Secondary reflection is restorative, not destructive; and recalling the argument Marcel uses to demonstrate that I am my-body, an indissoluble unit, it is necessary to point out that reflection "squared"<sup>45</sup> was the force operative in that argument.

Now this returns us as it were from the top to the crucial center at which the analysis of sensation had ended to the other face of the dilemma left unanswered. If the body is not an instrument, if sensation is not the transmission of a message, am I not flung into another endless circle through the priority of my body to everything sensed? I am right back where I started, only now using my body to feel my body.<sup>46</sup> Is not secondary reflection compelled into the very same frustrating round in terms of the spirit and not sensation?

To both questions Gabriel Marcel answers no. Each converges upon a reality that will reconcile the two aspects of the dilemma, the human person with its peculiarities of structure, its emancipating recollection. In this context he calls it an "immédiat non-médiatisable";<sup>47</sup> the self is the mediator between sensation and its term, between reflection and its term, and it requires no further mediation. The circle is broken, Marcel says, because so far as the self is concerned it was never begun;<sup>48</sup> and it was not begun in virtue of the impossibility of treating this mediating element (the self, the person) as an object, of forming in ourselves an idea of it.<sup>49</sup> Immersed in mystery, of its very nature mysterious, it is the final and underived reconciliation of all ontological difficulties, accomplished in the center of man.<sup>50</sup> My existence is the touchstone of all existence;<sup>51</sup> my body is the reference point for all existence;<sup>52</sup> that is, insofar as it is mine it is also nonobjective:

<sup>43</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 324.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 311-12; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 92-93.

<sup>45</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 118.

<sup>46</sup>*Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 101-2.

<sup>47</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 243; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 109, 125-48, particularly 128-37; *Etre et avoir*, p. 164.

<sup>48</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 241-44.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 243.

<sup>50</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 261, 265, 305-6.

<sup>51</sup>*Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 88-92.

<sup>52</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 261, 265, 325.

Je dirai qu'il y a dans le fait de mon corps quelque chose qui transcende ce qu'on peut appeler sa matérialité, qui ne se réduit à aucune de ses propriétés objectives ; et le monde n'existe pour moi qu'autant que je le pense (le mot est mauvaise), que je l'appréhende comme relié à moi par ce même fil qui me lie à mon corps.<sup>53</sup>

United in the personal mystery are sensation and reflection, and the prerogatives of personality guarantee the authenticity of both.

### III

Knowledge is, from one point of view, a one-sided affair. When I objectify a thing and hence know it other than as it is, my specious knowledge does not affect the thing itself (to use a terminology different from Marcel's) in its ontological reality. The existential uniqueness of a hammer persists unaffected by my ignoring it; its usefulness remains; but in the perfection of my being I suffer a deprivation; I am diminished. Too careful a man, too wary of idealist dangers, Gabriel Marcel never calls for a rectification of reality, which is what it is, but only for a restoration of man to the high dignity and mission his position necessarily delivers to him. Doubtless when man is off center, so the whole of reality follows suit. The mystery of reality is centered in man; hence it must catch the reflection of man's errors and deviations, and the correction of reality can only begin by reasserting human experience in its integrity. This is a traditional enough doctrine which need not here delay us.

It is quite a different affair when man is concerned not with a knowledge of things but with encounters with other human persons who, each one, bear about with them an unsuspected and alarming value. More than a false or true knowledge is at stake, although the origin of our painful responsibility is there. That whole wonderful complex we call human relationships can be profoundly altered by our attitude to the other persons we encounter in daily existence; a person is a reality terrifyingly different from, and richer than, any other thing in existence. Man can respond to man;<sup>54</sup> he is not mute. At once we are in a bewildering world of reciprocal exchange, hazardous, free, exciting, where destinies are linked and sufferings shared, where every wound is mine and each wounds the other; the human heart is the vulnerable target for all the good and evil moving amongst

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 305; cf. pp. 15, 303-4; *Etre et avoir*, pp. 8-12; *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 28.

<sup>54</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 138: "L'idée de réponse est donc le clef."

men. We hold in pitifully frail hands the happiness and despair of others.<sup>55</sup> Midway between the man-thing and man-God relationships, man finds himself face-to-face with man. Every man is my brother, and I live or die with him. This is the scene of tragedy, of solitude and communion, of deaths, farewells, and perseverances, the scene where we find sketched, perhaps lightly but not untruly, the designs, joys, miseries of a higher encounter.<sup>56</sup> Unless we are to confess our philosophical failure, we cannot arrest our investigations on the threshold where the drama of existence first begins to disclose its full depth and range.

Again it is a "broken world"<sup>57</sup> that faces us, only now it is divided into two levels called by Marcel the *lui* and the *toi*.<sup>58</sup> When I speak of someone in the third person I am referring to the order of the *lui*; I regard him as though he were not there; his presence or absence is irrelevant to the discussion I may be pursuing, whether that be with someone else or myself;<sup>59</sup> I have established a *triadique* relation independent of the actual location of the person concerned. The clearest example of this is filling in an official government questionnaire,<sup>60</sup> a matter of questions and answers whose result is a genealogical or biographical history. But the person questioned is unimportant. Even his death has no more significance than as an answer to the final question—"Dead or alive?"—and then the dossier is complete and the answers can be filed. In short, "le répertoire, c'est le lui,"<sup>61</sup> a completely depersonalized object with no particular privileges; we may ignore it with impunity. The term of this attitude is the identification of the person with his functional role in society,<sup>62</sup> resulting in a vilification of man<sup>63</sup> and a gigantic disregard of human suffering and agony.

Now this is not only true for others; I can also work the unhappy magic on my own person. I am *lui* for myself whenever I regard "me" as an essence,<sup>64</sup> if I become a kind of storehouse of experiences

<sup>55</sup>Cf. *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 176-80.

<sup>56</sup>Cf. *Etre et avoir*, pp. 292-95, 254-55.

<sup>57</sup>Cf. *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 18-39.

<sup>58</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 137-45, 169-75, 196, 199, 215-19; *Etre et avoir*, pp. 150-55; *Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 48-54, 71-73; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 176-83.

<sup>59</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 137.

<sup>60</sup>*Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>61</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 175.

<sup>62</sup>*The Philosophy of Existence*, pp. 1-2; *Reflection and Mystery*, pp. 20-36.

<sup>63</sup>*The Philosophy of Existence*, pp. 62-63.

<sup>64</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 99.

and information,<sup>65</sup> *un fichier*, when I am only a history and a past and nothing more. But still more disastrously, the act by which I think another as *lui* returns with poetic justice upon me, boomerangs fatally to render me as exterior to myself as the other is to me.<sup>66</sup> My reduction of him to a source of *renseignement* converts me, so far as he is concerned, into a registration apparatus, a pen scribbling on paper, a file-cabinet mind; it is as if we were both bound by our mutual indifference, one feeding on the other and neither capable of escaping from his prison.<sup>67</sup> As Pierre Colin points out,<sup>68</sup> we have here a creative communication working in both directions: (*a*) towards separation and the establishment of a mechanical human intercourse; (*b*) towards unity whereby an interior strengthening is effected in me.<sup>69</sup> *Lui* is multiplication; *toi* unifies.

If such is the case—that with the *lui* I am in the third person—under what conditions may I use the second person? When am I in the order of the *toi*? The answer is simple: When “ce qui est regardé par moi [est] susceptible de me répondre.”<sup>70</sup> Where no response is possible, there can be only the *lui*, and the possibility of a response cannot arise unless there are alternatives (*l'ordre des ou*);<sup>71</sup> the questions of the scientific investigator can never, on these terms, be considered an occasion for a genuine response. Response is the key simply because it is a sign of the *openness*<sup>72</sup> of the other. By openness we must understand we are beyond objectivity. Hence the *toi* is precisely the other as other, not as I idealize him<sup>73</sup> and enclose him within the circle of myself, but insofar as he is credited by me with an independent existence, with liberty;<sup>74</sup> insofar as he counts for me I do not call his existence in question.<sup>75</sup> The other is *toi* for me when I refuse to diminish his ontological worth in any way.

We must be cautious not to place the emphasis on the question (consider the variety of questions—from “What is the time?” to “Will you help me?”) but upon the response possible.<sup>76</sup> It is this

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>66</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 49, 71-78; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 145-46.

<sup>67</sup>Cf. *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 98.

<sup>68</sup>*Existentialisme chrétien*, p. 92.

<sup>69</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 53.

<sup>70</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 138.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>72</sup>Cf. *Etre et avoir*, pp. 317-18.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 154.

<sup>75</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 215.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 196.

idea of response, implying as it does a community ("us-ness"), that enables me even to conceive of transcending the category of the *lui*. There could be no response, no exchange or appeal or invocation, if we were not already together in some profound way, difficult to comprehend.<sup>77</sup> We have, discussing participation, come on this idea before, but it is here a question of ratifying this community, as it were activating its undisclosed potentialities; the *nous* secreted in all our human relationships has to be made explicit. When we fail to accomplish this, when we reject an appeal (*sois avec moi*), we are at once strangers to ourselves.<sup>78</sup> Our respective liberties collaborate, assist to produce a deeper freedom and union.<sup>79</sup> Of course I can refuse myself to the other, who also possesses this dread power, but only by closing myself up, locking charms and secrets out of all reach; a destructive act of self-defiance, since by it I repudiate my own ontological validity and renounce my personality and my claim to participate in those wider horizons of existence wherein I could fully express myself.

No; I must become *toi* for the other and he *toi* for me. This is imperative lest the human world be riddled with division, a frightful conglomeration of noncommunicating and incomunicable monads. There is one side of the question, the end to be achieved, the perfect human intercourse in which nothing is lost, nothing betrayed, the realization of a sure solidarity. How to attain this? On such a sublime and dangerous level, what will correspond to the recuperative action of secondary reflection? The passage from the *lui* to the *toi* and thence to the *nous* must be made. What forces have we at our command?

Marcel leaves no room for uncertainty. The answer is love.<sup>80</sup> In human affairs the spiritual commerce in which men engage is most important; and there it is question of love, nothing else.<sup>81</sup> The *toi* is the nonobjective. By definition I cannot treat him as not being there; I cannot abstract from him. The *toi* is noncircumscribed, is greater than a bundle of determining elements. Now this is just the reality that love engages; love bears upon the being, not the *idea* of the being.<sup>82</sup> The being I love has not, at least at first, qualities I total and upon whose sum I decide whether or not to love. Love grasps a

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>78</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 73.

<sup>79</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 154; *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 73; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 145-46.

<sup>80</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 63-65, 146, 157-59, 207, 216-19.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 207.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 218.

whole. The more I love, the less do such qualifying activities (the very character of the objective, of the *lui*) seem adequate to my experience.<sup>83</sup> "Je ne l'aime pas à cause de ce qu'il est, j'aime ce qu'il est, parce que c'est lui."<sup>84</sup> We need only recall that when we speak with someone for whom we have no particular regard, he is automatically a *lui*, a collection of answers to pragmatic questions. In a striking phrase Marcel says that this person is himself a *questionnaire rempli*.<sup>85</sup> Love brings with it—rather is the means to—a participation in the life of the loved one, so that the two aspects dissociated by analysis (*le répertoire et le vivant*)<sup>86</sup> are rejoined by an act of love; and the absurdity of such an abstraction is made known. "L'amour, c'est-à-dire, créé son objet." In brief, "the being I love is as little as possible a third person (*tiers*) for me."<sup>87</sup>

Evidently this doctrine has considerable significance for human knowledge; but let us beware how clumsily we tread in the country where love and knowledge, will and intellect, carry on their activities. Love reaches the individuality, the unique.<sup>88</sup> On the other hand, love does not disperse the individuality of the beloved into numberless abstract notes. In this sense that it upholds and affirms the transcendence of the being loved over all pulverizing reductions, love can be called the perfect knowledge. Nevertheless, love is nothing if it is blind (if it knowingly cuts itself off from understanding),<sup>89</sup> and we are led to posit an intimate co-operation between the two. Through love I trespass (*anticiper*) boldly into areas whose configurations and detail (*prédictats*) subsequent experience will surrender to me.

We should not be misled by Scholastic language and condemnations; these are not Scholastic concepts. In this way alone, according to Marcel, can we assert that love comes first,<sup>90</sup> for love encloses knowledge<sup>91</sup> and is, in the last analysis, the spirit vivifying it, raising it out of objectivity and restoring it to the living world of men. Love indeed is a kind of *renaissance*,<sup>92</sup> a new birth into subjectivity for me and my loved one; our participation is complete; we are *toi* for each other,

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 63, 135. Cf. p. 216: "Royce a vu profondément que l'amour individualise."

<sup>89</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>90</sup>Cf. *Etre et avoir*, p. 244.

<sup>91</sup>Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, p. 63.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 217.

and nothing divides us. Gabriel Marcel puts it thus: "Love is the very negation of essence (objectivity, the not-free)—it implies faith in the perpetual renewal of the person you love, and a trust that nothing is, nor can ever be, absolutely lost."<sup>93</sup>

#### IV

No discussion of human knowledge would be complete without considering its extent to the farthest reaches of thought, to the knowledge of God. Do we have any knowledge of God? What kind is it, if we do? From the consistency of this philosophy, we can expect a continuity of teaching; and continuity there is. Selection here is particularly necessary, and a negative approach may clear much of the undergrowth and set precisely the boundaries of the problem. Because in its resolution the chief characteristics of our knowledge of God are exhibited, the central question is the possibility and nature of the proof of God's existence.

The traditional Thomist proofs, Marcel argues, are not universally convincing.<sup>94</sup> He accepts this as an indisputable fact, into whose reasons it is necessary to inquire. He infers that their partial ineffectiveness can only be due to the fact that they presuppose a preliminary grounding in God; that is to say, there is something in the argumentation that has not been successfully included in the formulae expressing the argument.<sup>95</sup> But that does not signify either an unreserved rejection of the proofs of classical Scholasticism on the one hand or an unreserved acceptance if the conditions were reversed. The proofs must be penetrated and from them extracted what they conceal in their present form. When everything has been said on this subject—and a very great deal is said<sup>96</sup>—the hidden element we seek is revealed as none other than belief, whose act the arguments raise to the level of discursive thought,<sup>97</sup> in order to prove anything a certain datum is always presupposed,<sup>98</sup> which in this instance is a belief in God; and the origin of this belief is not in question. Now this is not

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>94</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 141.

<sup>95</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 229-30.

<sup>96</sup>Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 38-41, 56-68, 77, 137, 152-59, 222-25, 232-33, 254-60, 264; *Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 226-36; *Etre et avoir*, pp. 141, 175-79, 296-318. Marcel returns unceasingly to the problems of faith and God, and in almost any context. This is necessary for him, since, as we hope to show, they are all parts of the machinery by which intelligibility is slipped back into reality.

<sup>97</sup>*Etre et avoir*, pp. 141, 175.

<sup>98</sup>Cf. *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 226.

only true for the Thomistic proofs but for any proof whatever claiming to demonstrate the existence of God. Every proof begins thus: "Il y a d'abord un 'je suis assuré que . . .' "<sup>99</sup> Belief is the result of an act of faith; proof is enveloped in belief and so it is not a substitute for belief. It reasserts and strengthens the actual, if often wobbling, equivalence that holds between faith and the exigency proper to reason.<sup>100</sup> Hence the question of the existence of God is nothing else but a religious problem.<sup>101</sup>

Now it is important we do not take this point as a kind of parody of what faith was for the Scholastics, operative in a crude and primitive fideist manner. Faith is a recapitulation, at the highest possible level, of the kind of thought Marcel has been all along calling non-objective. In the case at issue, the "object" is God, or related matters like religious history, prayer, miracles, sanctity, and so on.<sup>102</sup> These might all be called transcendent realities. Religious thought is in the order of the nonverifiable, nonuniversal.<sup>103</sup> Faith is religious thought at its supreme point of perfection: "l'objet de foi ne se présente absolument pas avec les caractères qui distinguent une personne empirique quelconque."<sup>104</sup> It is necessary to say "the highest possible level," for faith issues from and engages the whole being of the human person.<sup>105</sup> On this plane occurs the greatest of all dramas. The person runs momentous risks, experiences the most hazardous course: the salvation or damnation of the soul.<sup>106</sup> Here recuperative reflection works upon the "I believe."<sup>107</sup>

We are forced to admit, says Marcel, that in the strict sense of the word no demonstration of the existence of God is possible.<sup>108</sup> Demonstration is concerned with the universally verifiable, and this, we know, is in the present situation an impossibility. But what of an affirmation? he asks. Remember, it is the unique and living instant, the immediate experiential contact that concerns us; the individual

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 231-32. Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, p. 60.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 223.

<sup>102</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 49-50, 96-99, 255-60.

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 99. Cf. p. 41: "Le sujet de la foi n'est pas la pensée en général."

<sup>104</sup>*Etre et avoir*, p. 308.

<sup>105</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 308.

<sup>106</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 31-33, 129-34; *Journal métaphysique*, pp. 197-203, 282; 299: "La zone de l'épreuve est le champ de la liberté." *Homo Viator* (Paris, Aubier), p. 73.

<sup>107</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 235; cf. *Etre et avoir*, pp. 175-76.

<sup>108</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 255.

instead of the abstract.<sup>109</sup> An experience such as we are searching for is contained in phrases like "I believe" or "I hope"; and Pierre Colin would seem to be right<sup>110</sup> when he argues that the movement is necessarily from my liberty to a sovereign and personal liberty<sup>111</sup> from which alone can come the appeal I respond to. And how respond? Suppose I say, I hope in you for us<sup>112</sup>—what is the link binding the *toi* and *nous*, or binding me and my situation or body, which I as it were ratify by conforming myself (thus defining me) to the necessity of it exposed by secondary reflection? God is this link, *recours ou témoin absolu*; and our speculations on the person, the subject of the "I believe," reveal why. For, in the face of despair or dissolution (always possible), the person expresses an absolute hope or belief which evidently cannot come from himself or his situation. This absolute response from the creature can only come subsequent to the appeal from the infinite being to which he owes everything he is;<sup>113</sup> through recollection the person is aware of his participation, his communion, which confirms his nonindependence. Having experienced this absolute hope or fidelity, the person can no more doubt, because such a doubt would involve his self-destruction.<sup>114</sup>

Clearly we have here a dialectic of affirmation<sup>115</sup> that carries me constantly beyond myself. But this should not be too difficult to understand, Marcel says, as we have already seen in what way I am not contained by myself; I overflow in a kind of natural tendency outwards to the beyond. Reflection on the "I believe" or "I hope" locates the full meaning of the affirmation in the proposition, "Je crois en Toi, qui es mon recours unique."<sup>116</sup> The classical proofs for the existence of God take place interior to this experience, this affirmation. Personality is the beginning and end. I become truly what I am, a person, through the mediation of the act by which I focus on the reality of God.<sup>117</sup> It is another way of saying that without God I become an impossibility, which human experience shows to be

<sup>109</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 253-54.

<sup>110</sup>*Existentialisme chrétien*, p. 51. Cf. *Homo Viator*, p. 61, where hope and liberty are intimately related in the discussion.

<sup>111</sup>Cf. *Journal métaphysique*, p. 254.

<sup>112</sup>*Homo Viator*, p. 81.

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>114</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, pp. 235-36. Cf. *Homo Viator*, p. 62. With an absolute confidence no deception is possible; the ascending dialectic of hope rises over all obstacles and inferior objects.

<sup>115</sup>*Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 235.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 235-36.

false. Hence God is *le Toi absolu*;<sup>118</sup> and love and faith cannot, must not ever be dissociated.<sup>119</sup> Human personality is modeled on the divine; the beginning is truly in the end. If this philosophy is a metaphysic of the personal, it has been zealous never to dethrone the Personality which it seeks and which alone can satisfy it.

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<sup>118</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, pp. 215, 274. Where there is mystery, there is the *toi*, and we know that God can never be a problem. Also *Du refus à l'invocation*, p. 53.

<sup>119</sup>*Journal métaphysique*, p. 58.



# THE MIRROR OF TRUTH ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

SISTER RITAMARY BRADLEY, C.H.M.

Some modern philosophers have cut themselves off from traditional theory on the grounds that past systems of thought offer no unity between two poles of truth. The truth of transcendentals, even if one admit such an order, never touches the truth that regulates practical matters. Hence, such a modern philosopher as John Dewey formally rejects systems which rest on "mirror" or "spectator" theories of knowledge.<sup>1</sup> He proposes instead to seek out the goals of man's activity solely within the testing ground of experience, in the area of perceptible things.

For many twentieth-century thinkers the greater part of the Middle Ages is overlooked in their surveys of past thought, or else the era is imprecisely associated with the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> Yet in the very high point of the intellectual activity of the Middle Ages there is significant controversy bearing on the vision of truth and the relations between the speculative and practical orders in man's activity and final end. It is rooted, like many modern controversies, in a theory of knowledge.

One may approach the problem through a study of the use of the image of the mirror in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. This image is one of those metaphors which the Thomistic scholar Father Chenu maintains should be followed in detail through St. Thomas's thought—a figure which should be taken up, reimagined, and thought out in order to see how it is freed from its literal restrictions and used

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<sup>1</sup>See John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1926), pp. 309-10; and *The Quest for Certainty* ("Gifford Lectures," 1929. New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), pp. 55-60.

<sup>2</sup>Richard McKeon, "Thomas Aquinas' Doctrine of Knowledge and Its Historical Setting," *Speculum*, III (1928), 426. Note also the survey section of *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 1-39, for an example of such an omission.

constructively to convey a profound insight.<sup>3</sup> Agreeing with Father Wébert,<sup>4</sup> Father Chenu points out the function of the mirror metaphor to clarify problems of knowledge, but both scholars confine their remarks to St. Thomas's use of the image in discussing cognition of singulars. It will be shown that the metaphor has wider applications in St. Thomas's writings, being found in such early works as the *Commentaries on the Sentences* (1254-56), occurring with great frequency in the *De Veritate* (1256-59), appearing again in *Quodlibetal Question X* (1256-72); *De Potentia Dei* (1265-67); *Summa Theologica*, I (1266), II-II (1268-72), III (1272); and *De Spiritualibus Creaturis* (1266-69).<sup>5</sup>

The mirror image as St. Thomas uses it relates to knowledge in God, angels, and men. By internal adjustments in this one figure he presents aspects of the analogy of knowledge in schematic fashion. The mirror in this connection, though it is used with much flexibility, is basically a way of talking about knowledge which is through a medium—through a similitude caused by the object known—as distinguished from knowledge through immediate union with that which is apprehended.

Such a distinction was not an idle one in the particular historical situation of the thirteenth century at the University of Paris. Through St. Augustine in particular, Christians remained familiar with the metaphor of the mirror, wherein the invisible was seen through the visible, not only as the analogy related to a theory of knowledge, but more pertinently in its applications to the Christian life.<sup>6</sup> Christians were urged to conform themselves, partially here and perfectly hereafter, to the image of the Word mirrored in their minds. The later commentaries on the works of Denys the Pseudo-Areopagite had put additional stress on a mystical interpretation of the Neoplatonic world of mirrored intelligences; the cascades of illuminations, degree by degree, were to show forth the divine goodness as imitated in the lives of the saints.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup>M. D. Chenu, O.P., *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin* ("Études de philosophie médiévale." Paris: J. Vrin, 1950), pp. 144-46.

<sup>4</sup>J. Wébert, O.P., "L'image dans l'oeuvre de s. Thomas et spécialement dans l'exposé doctrinal sur l'intelligence humaine," *Revue Thomiste*, XXXI (1926), 445.

<sup>5</sup>The chronology is taken from Vernon J. Bourke, *Introduction to the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Reprinted from *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia* (New York: Musurgia Publs., 1948), I, xii-xiv.

<sup>6</sup>This is a frequent analogy in St. Augustine. A significant example is *De Trinitate*, XV, 9-11 (*PL*, XLII, 1063-74).

<sup>7</sup>See H. Weisweiler, S.J., "Die Ps.—Dionysiuskommentaire 'In Coelestem Hierarchiam' des Skotus Eruigena und Hugos von St. Viktor," *Recherches*

Out of the controversies over Augustinian and Aristotelian philosophic theories there arose at the same time on the speculative side some questions about knowledge difficult to reconcile with Aristotelian metaphysics and the teachings of faith. The questions were ably argued. Is God ever apprehended here below in direct vision or only seen in the obscurity of the "mirror of creatures"?<sup>8</sup> Does knowledge through the mediation of a similitude, demanded by Aristotelians, exclude the immediate intuition of spiritual realities in the soul?<sup>9</sup> If Aristotle is followed in denying that the human intellect can come to the knowledge of singulars, can that intellect ever attain to the operation for which it was made—knowledge of the divine essence?<sup>10</sup> At the other extreme, do the saints in heaven actually participate in knowledge of the divine essence or only share in a mirror knowledge of God as power, beauty, and truth?<sup>11</sup> Opinions drawn from some of these interpretations of mirror knowledge were among the condemned propositions under action of the Bishop of Paris in 1240 and 1241, about the time St. Thomas was beginning to study at the University.

It would be surprising if some of this serious conflict did not leave its impression on the writings of St. Thomas, for the issues were not entirely closed ones after the promulgation of the decrees at

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*de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XIX (1952), 26-47. In a crucial re-emphasis by Hugh of St. Victor, portions of the text as translated by Eruigena are made to apply to the imitation of God—to becoming a similitude of the divine (p. 30). The author finds this influence to have been far-reaching among the followers of Hugh of St. Victor.

For further discussion of the "mirrored" similitudes in the writings of the Areopagite see H. F. Dondaine, O.P., "L'objet et le 'medium' de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *ibid.*, 64-65.

<sup>8</sup>William of Auxerre in *Summa Aurea* (c. 1220) opposed a naturalistic mysticism which abused the teaching of Augustine by pretending to the vision of God here below; William of Auxerre defends the thesis that in this life God is visible only *per speculum creaturarum*. (Dondaine, "L'objet et le 'medium' de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," p. 75).

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.* William of Auxerre in the same work (*Summa Aurea*) defended the immediate intuition of spiritual realities as against the Aristotelians, who demanded a similitude for all knowledge.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. William of Auvergne (c. 1230) in *De Anima*, c. 7, 1 (Rouen, 1674, t. II, suppl., p. 203). He maintains that in refusing to the intellect the knowledge of singulars Aristotle radically suppressed the operation of intellect in that for which before all else it had been created—the clear and immediate vision of the Creator (Dondaine, "L'objet et le 'medium' de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," p. 92).

<sup>11</sup>In 1241 the University of Paris condemned this proposition: ". . . quod divina essentia in se nec ab homine nec ab angelo videbitur" (*Chartularium Univ. Paris*, t. 1, n. 28 [Paris, 1889]; cited by Dondaine, p. 61, note). The following affirmation was confirmed: "Firmiter credimus et asserimus quod Deus in sua essentia vel substantia videbitur ab angelis

Paris. Furthermore, the underlying tension lay ultimately in the serious counter-claims of a mysticism that was somewhat divorced from a defensible metaphysics<sup>12</sup> and of an Aristotelian philosophy that was at some points inimical to the teachings of faith. On this many-faceted problem hinged the discussion of the knowledge of visible things, of knowledge in a mirror. We shall attempt to reconstruct in part what St. Thomas does by way of a synthesis between these conflicting claims in his discussion of the analogy of knowledge<sup>13</sup> relative to God, angels, and men.

### THE MIRROR METAPHOR IN RELATION TO GOD

Particularly when speaking of God St. Thomas forewarns against employing the mirror image in a material, imaginative sense, but indicates that the point of comparison is often verified only in a "spiritual mirror"; that is, one in which intelligible rather than sensible likenesses are received.<sup>14</sup> With this limitation God may be

et omnibus sanctis et videbitur ab animabus glorificatis" (*ibid.*, p. 170; cited by Dondaine, p. 61).

<sup>12</sup>For a discussion of later developments in this aspect of the mystical elements in the Augustinian and Dionysian writings, see Edward F. Cranz, "Saint Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of Western Christian Thought," *Speculum*, XXVIII (April, 1953), 297-316. Cranz discusses some of the uses made by Augustine of the image of the mirror. He then analyzes the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (c. 1400-1464), which he characterizes as "a last stage in a dialogue between Platonism and Christianity" (p. 315). He says in summary (pp. 311-12): "Nicholas can now explain the place of Romans i, 20, in a unified system of Christian knowledge. He writes in the *De Docta Ignorantia* that all the wisest Christians had agreed that 'visible things are in truth images of things invisible and that the Creator can be seen in a kind of knowledge (*cognoscibiliter*) through the creatures, as it were in a dim reflection in a mirror'" (from *De Docta Ignorantia*, I, 11 [*Opera* (Leipzig), I, 22]). Cranz sees this doctrine as a possible development of one phase of Augustine's thought into a system of "knowing ignorance."

<sup>13</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 11 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 44) gives an explanation of this analogy.

<sup>14</sup>Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 2 ad 4 (ed. Parma [1948], VI, 483); and *De Ver.*, q. 12, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 202).

The belief that St. Thomas viewed metaphorical language disparagingly is supported by the text which he quotes from Aristotle without comment: "Procedere autem per similitudines varias et repraesentationes est proprium poeticae, quae est infima inter omnes doctrinas" (*ST*, I, q. 1, a. 9, obj. 1). In this connection the following text might also be considered: ". . . visus proprie est quidam corporalis sensus; unde si nomen visionis ad immateriale cognitionem transferatur, hoc non erit nisi metaphorice. In talibus autem locutionibus secundum diversas similitudines in rebus repertas diversa est veritatis ratio; unde nihil prohibet aliquando omnem scientiam divinam visionem dici, aliquando vero solum illam quae est

called a mirror, if one means a cause in which intelligible natures pre-exist as in their principle.<sup>15</sup> The Word is a mirror in this sense, for the likenesses of all created things shine forth in Him;<sup>16</sup> like a mirror He leads to the knowledge of other things;<sup>17</sup> and He is the uncreated mirror of the Godhead inasmuch as the species of divinity is received in Him from the Father.<sup>18</sup> God's foreknowledge and providence may be designated as the mirror of eternity,<sup>19</sup> in the sense that He beholds in an unchanging present and all at once whatever is future and successive by reference to contingent things—in the way that many things are seen at once and without discursiveness in a glass.<sup>20</sup> Yet this eternal mirror should be said to be of the will, since even those who look upon the divine essence see in it only as much as God wills that they should know about the things He can make and the things He will do.<sup>21</sup> However, this restriction refers to the blessed and those in the state of rapture; prophets seeing the future do not see God, but a created likeness, temporal in itself. It is called the "eternal mirror" because what it represents is eternal.<sup>22</sup> The soul of Christ alone among created intellects sees all things—all possibles and future contingents—but He sees by the form of the divine essence and not by any mirror or medium of knowledge.<sup>23</sup>

By introducing certain limitations on his own earlier use of the metaphor, St. Thomas seems to hesitate to repeat that things are seen in God as in a mirror. He proposes instead the comparison that things are seen in God as effects are known virtually in their causes.<sup>24</sup> This effect-cause relationship is a better statement, he explains, because things seen in a mirror are really distinct—an aspect of the com-

*praesentium, praeteritorum, et futurorum*" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 9 ad 3 [ed. Parma (1859), IX, 41]).

<sup>15</sup>*In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, aa. 2, 4 and ad 4 (ed. Parma [1948], VI, 483).

<sup>16</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 1, sed contra (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 53). Though this is merely an argument "to the contrary," the context of the body of the article supports the opinion that St. Thomas accepts it. The comparison is formally advanced *ibid.*, q. 12, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 202).

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1, sed contra. St. Thomas seems to accept this argument in his answer to objection 10 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 54).

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 12, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 202).

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 12 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 46).

<sup>20</sup>*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 7.

<sup>21</sup>*In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 5 ad 6 (ed. Parma [1857], VII, 1207).

<sup>22</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 13, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 202); and *ST*, II-II, q. 173, a.

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<sup>23</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 20, a. 5 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 301).

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 8, a. 4 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 119). In an earlier text an accommodation had been made by calling the things seen in God likenesses "in a spiritual mirror." See n. 15 above.

parison which cannot be applied to God, if one is mindful of the divine simplicity.<sup>25</sup> In another place he recalls that things seen in a mirror are beheld as divided and many—as many men are in a house; and in this respect “mirror” is not an apt figure for God, in whom all is unity.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, since likenesses in a mirror are really caused by the objects which are reflected, one may not in this meaning call God a mirror.<sup>27</sup> However some people may have erred on these points, the saints<sup>28</sup> have never said that God is the mirror of things in this sense; and insofar as likenesses of things pre-exist in God they are properly called not mirrors but exemplars.<sup>29</sup> In summary, God's self-knowledge, whether regarded under the aspect of the divine essence or (what is identical with it) the divine ideas, may be said to be like knowledge in a mirror. If in any other connection the figure seems to introduce a separation between the divine essence and the ideas, it must not be used.

### ANGELS AS MIRRORS

Fittingly enough, it is after a discussion of the degrees of goodness or perfection proper to all beings that St. Thomas takes up the question of angelic knowledge in terms of the mirror metaphor.<sup>30</sup> Irrational creatures attain only an imperfect goodness, which is their natural end, whereas rational creatures, including man, can attain perfect goodness—that is, beatitude.<sup>31</sup> Knowledge of Gods admits of proportionate degrees; whereas it is natural for God to know Himself as the eternal mirror through His essence, man knows God in this life in a mirror of similitudes—that is, by deriving knowledge from sensible things.<sup>32</sup> Angelic knowledge lies midway between these two and is properly speaking not knowledge in a mirror.

What happens, then, to the familiar conception of angelic mirrors

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 20, a. 4 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 298).

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 12, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 202).

<sup>28</sup>The text gives *sancti*, referring to those Fathers of the Church whose authority may be invoked in religious matters. Cf. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, p. 116.

<sup>29</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 12, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 202).

<sup>30</sup>However, it is not from the Platonists but from Aristotle that the citation is made. See *Truth*, translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), I, 458, where the reference is given as Aristotle, *De caelo*, ii. 12. 292b10-20.

<sup>31</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 3 ad 12 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 117).

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, ad 17 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 117-18).

under this limitation? The metaphor enters into the schematization in other ways. (a) The angelic intellect has received innate forms; and, unlike man's mind, it may be called a mirror or tablet on which intelligible characters shine forth or are depicted.<sup>33</sup> (b) An angel knows other things (as distinguished from self-knowledge) not through an essence but through intelligible species, distinct from its essence.<sup>34</sup> St. Thomas denies that one could argue to the opposite opinion even by comparison with a physical mirror, which if it could know itself would have to know other things by forms within itself and distinct from it.<sup>35</sup> When the beatified angels know things in the Word, they are not then said to see as does a man looking in a mirror, if this be taken to mean that they can see all things that God can do.<sup>36</sup> (c) Angels are enlightened by other mirrors, the angels of a higher order, who constitute mediums proportionate to their created intellects.<sup>37</sup> The saying that the angel is a perfect mirror is true with regard to its clarity but not true in the absolute sense—that there is no limitation or defect in the angelic intellect, for angels do not know all things.<sup>38</sup> The perfect coincidence of being and knowing is thus reserved for the divine mind, whose self-knowing truly encompasses all reality. (d) In a sublime sense an angel is a mirror in that he knows God not in any visible similitude but in the created image of God which is stamped on his own nature.<sup>39</sup> (e) Lastly, an angel's intellect is likened in its formation to material things, which receive subsistence through the eternal reasons in God.<sup>40</sup> Both material and spiritual substances, then, are mirrors of the divine ideas which give them a likeness to First Truth.

#### MAN'S KNOWLEDGE AND THE MIRROR METAPHOR

All of man's knowledge as a wayfarer is by way of similitudes caused by visible things, foreshadowing the perfect union with the object of knowledge, which is beatitude. This knowledge on earth may be considered in its extraordinary modes, in the knowledge of faith, and in modes proper to man's natural condition.

In the extraordinary knowledge of the prophet, the mind is an

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, a. 9 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 130).

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*, a. 8 ad 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 128).

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, obj. 8 and ad 8 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 357-60).

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, a. 4 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 119).

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, obj. 3 and ad 3 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 118 and 120).

<sup>39</sup>*ST*, I, q. 56, a. 3.

<sup>40</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 9 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 130).

inferior mirror reflecting truth from the superior mirror, which is God.<sup>41</sup> The ideas in the prophet's mind are also mirrors in that they show forth the clarity of eternity.<sup>42</sup>

To see by faith is to see obscurely through a mirror, as when one sees a man in a glass.<sup>43</sup> This is a kind of imperfect soundness of soul, which will give place to the perfect health of beatitude, when man sees God by His essence.<sup>44</sup> However, even before the fall, though man did not see with his present obscurity, still he only saw God by a kind of expressed likeness of the uncreated light, and hence even then in a mirror.<sup>45</sup>

Most of these comparisons are familiar and traditional enough, but man's natural knowledge, too, is brought into the schematization. In the cognition of sensible things, man knows through the medium of a species; but his intellect is directed, not to the image, but to the real object which caused the image. So it is when we consider an object seen in a mirror. However, man can also return to a consideration of the image (that is, of the phantasm), and we have then an analogy of how man can know singulars with his intellect. This reflective act is possible because of the dynamic continuity between imagination and intellect, figured metaphorically by the relation of a mirror to the reflection contained in it.<sup>46</sup> In another mirror comparison it is pointed out that man's proper knowledge of God in this life is through likenesses in things that somehow represent Him.<sup>47</sup> He is then known through speculation<sup>48</sup> or meditation.<sup>49</sup>

The way visible things represent God is made more specific when it is asked if man, as a wayfarer, knows all that he knows in the First Truth. In this connection a familiar text from St. Augustine is quoted<sup>50</sup>—not as in the original context in relation to the saints,

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 12, a. 6 ad 7 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 203). This reading, however, is not found in all versions. See *Truth*, translated by James V. McGlynn, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), II, 437-38, note 4. Here it is stated that the Leonine text has *world* instead of *mirror* in this passage. The earlier editions have *speculum* instead of *saeculum*, and the "mirror" reading has been used in the English translation.

<sup>42</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 12, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 203). Cf. *De Pot.*, q. 4, a. 2 ad 27 (ed. Parma [1859], VIII, 95).

<sup>43</sup>*ST*, I, q. 56, a. 3. This is not expressly called knowledge by faith, but it is called knowledge of God *in via*.

<sup>44</sup>*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 11 ad 9 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 177).

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 1 ad 1 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 274).

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 6 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 37).

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 1 ad 1 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 274).

<sup>48</sup>*In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3c (ed. Parma [1859], VII, 403).

<sup>49</sup>*ST*, II-II, q. 180, a. 3 ad 2.

<sup>50</sup>St. Thomas quotes the passage in the following places: *De Ver.*, q. 10,

who imitate divine perfection, but in relation to the ordinary knowledge of men. Truths are diminished among men, according to the text, as one face is reflected in many mirrors—or, as St. Thomas adds, as the Face of Truth is seen in the fragments of a broken mirror.<sup>51</sup> The First Truth, remaining one, is multiplied, in a sense, in as many minds as know things, and even, it may be said, in the number of things known.<sup>52</sup> The mirrored likenesses of the First Truth are the agent intellect and the first principles, naturally known, complex and imcomplex.<sup>53</sup> These are able to judge of truth only by their similitude to the First Truth, infallible and unchangeable.<sup>54</sup> Hence, man sees in two truths—one in the intentional order, or the truth mirrored in the intellect; and the other in the real order, in the things seen in this mirrored truth.<sup>55</sup> It will be recalled that material things are compared even to the angelic mirrors in that they are constituted in their subsistence as true by the divine mind.<sup>56</sup> Thus men see, not separated ideas, but created likenesses of the First Truth in the things they know.<sup>57</sup>

To be perfect yet remains for men—that is, to be united to their principle. Already united like all other creatures by way of similitude, men must be united to God in the next life by way of operation, which is to know Him without a medium or a mirror.<sup>58</sup>

The treatment of one final application of the analogy of the one truth in many mirrors confirms the fact that the image is subjected to scrutiny and criticism before being accepted. Truth Incarnate, too, may with fitting reservations be spoken of as the One Truth in the broken mirrors of the sacramental species, but only if the comparison

a. 11 ad 12 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 177); *Quodl.* X, q. 4, a. 7 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 605); *ST*, I, q. 16, a. 6; and *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 10 ad 8 (ed. Parma [1859], VIII, 460). *ST*, III, q. 76, a. 3 (ed. Ottawa [1944], IV, 2952a) gives it freely. The original text reads: “*Salvum me fac, Domine, quoniam defecit sanctus: id est non inveniuntur: sicut loquimur cum dicimus, Defecit frumentum, aut Defecit pecunia. Quoniam diminutae sunt veritates a filii hominum. Veritas una est, qua illustrantur animae sanctae: sed quoniam multae sunt animae, in ipsis multae veritates dici possunt; sicut ab una facie multae in speculis imagines apparent*” (*In Psalmum XI, Enarratio [PL, XXXVI, 138]*).

<sup>51</sup>*ST*, I, q. 16, a. 6.

<sup>52</sup>*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 10 ad 8 (ed. Parma [1859], VIII, 460); and *Quodl.* X, q. 4, a. 7 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 605).

<sup>53</sup>*Quodl.*, X, q. 4, a. 7 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 605).

<sup>54</sup>*ST*, I, q. 16, a. 6 ad 1; and *Quodl.* X, q. 4, a. 7.

<sup>55</sup>*Quodl.* X, q. 4, a. 7.

<sup>56</sup>See n. 40 above.

<sup>57</sup>*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 10 ad 8.

<sup>58</sup>*Quodl.* X, q. 8, a. 17 (ed. Parma [1859], IX, 611).

be understood in the limits of its application.<sup>59</sup>

The one mirror analogy, then, intimately interlinks all reality in a seriated analogy of truth, which is many in one. No fragment of reality, intentional or substantial, would seem to be left out of the synthesis. The use of the metaphor is not purely traditional,<sup>60</sup> as is illustrated by the intellectualizing of the Augustinian text on the multiplication of the Face of Truth in many mirrors, while omitting the former application to the lives of the saints. Neither is the image entirely cut off from traditional usage. When it is retained, it is sometimes manipulated so that the older phrasing expresses what St. Thomas wishes to say. Furthermore, the contemporary situation of the thirteenth century, at the very least, makes the synthesis more boldly constructive.<sup>61</sup>

This construction is clearly on the side of expressing a realistic theory of knowledge. The mirror or medium of ordinary cognition is caused by the thing, and it has therefore no affinity with the separated Platonic form. First Truth is mirrored, not in an Augustinian illumination, but in the agent intellect and in first principles, whereby other things are made intelligible and judged as true. Finally, these things which are known and which cause knowledge are (like angelic mirrors) constituted in their entity by the divine truth, whose self-knowing is the eternal mirror of all reality.

What is the relation of this speculative scheme to the practical order? It reaches a synthesis in viewing first speculative principles as a mirror of First Truth; and the relation between first speculative and first practical principles is an intimate one.<sup>62</sup> No testing ground of experience is left for man to be practical about except in the similitude of First Truth. The mirror refers consistently to some aspect of the eternal reason rather than to some moral exemplar or rule of

<sup>59</sup>ST, III, q. 76, a. 3 (ed. Ottawa [1944], IV, 2952a).

<sup>60</sup>See Dondaine, "L'objet et le 'medium' de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," p. 97. The author seems to incline to the view that the discussion of theophanies in St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure is a reversion to classical texts and not specifically an echo of contemporary controversy.

<sup>61</sup>See Aelred Squire, "The Doctrine of the Image in the *De Veritate* of St. Thomas," *Dominican Studies*, IV (1951), 164-77. The writer finds the *De Veritate* to proceed from St. Thomas's fascination with St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* and his sense of the acceptableness of Aristotle's theory of soul and knowledge (p. 165). Squire does not offer a particularly explicit opinion on the relation of St. Thomas's views to contemporary controversy.

<sup>62</sup>See Vernon J. Bourke, *Ethics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 172-76. Cf. also Mother Marie Louise Martinez, *Recta Ratio according to Saint Thomas* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1950), pp. 66-67 and 94.

life.<sup>63</sup> Lastly, the point of emphasis throughout is the exposition of man's knowledge as a wayfarer in contrast to his knowledge when he reaches his ultimate end.<sup>64</sup> Such, then, is the distinctive development of the traditional mirror analogy in the Thomistic structure of truth.

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<sup>63</sup>The traditional development of the mirror analogy was generally in a loosely didactic mode and referred to persons who were moral exemplars or to rules of life often drawn in some way from the Scriptures as the mirror of truth.

<sup>64</sup>The contrast throughout is in the phrases *in via* and *in patria*.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*La metafisica di F. H. Bradley.* By M. T. Antonelli. Milan: Edit. Bocca, 1952. Pp. 278.

This book by M. T. Antonelli is the only long essay available in Italian on Bradley, for up to ten years ago Italian scholars had not given much attention to British and American idealism. Consequently, this work, which shows a thorough knowledge of Bradley's own works and of the bibliography on Bradley, is even more valuable.

In a quite elaborate introduction Mr. Antonelli sketches a history of British Hegelianism, with particular stress on Sterling, on whose interpretation of Hegel all the British idealists depend, even when they try to get back beyond it to the original meaning of Hegel.

Bradley's philosophy is considered by Mr. Antonelli to be almost exclusively a moment in the crisis of idealism, which arises when the faith in an exhaustively rational system is shaken or lost. Even Hegel would allow for conflicting moments of becoming; but the gap between them is bridged by the dialectic, so that ultimately, in Hegel's system, they would coincide in a perfect realization of the idea. Bradley pulls completely apart these two stages: the contradiction from which dialectic springs, and the perfect healing of it, the Absolute. The diversity between subject and predicate, which are understood by Bradley as the real and the ideal aspects of an object, is essential to thought. Without it, thought could not even exist, and by trying to reach a perfect unity, it "aims at its suicide," since a comprehensive whole could not be defined in terms of mere thought. Hence the place of a purely rational idea is taken over by an Absolute as experiential unity, an individual and harmonious experience being the only feature that can be applied to it. The appearances, the finite and individual objects of experience, are no longer necessary steps of the development of the Absolute. They have a *de facto* necessity, since they are included in the one reality insofar as they are actual; but the Absolute could have manifested itself in any other possible way. The relation between finite and infinite becomes loose; and while the Absolute is being more and more frequently spoken of as ineffable, the differences in value of the single experiences are flattened.

Such is the central intuition of Bradley's doctrine, according to Mr. Antonelli, who points out how Bradley's treatment of the different problems taken up in *Appearance and Reality* turns out to be only a more detailed application of his metaphysical framework of terms and relations. No positive link to the Absolute can be found in appearances, though Bradley claims that they form one single reality; nor is it clear how any positive qualification about the Absolute can be derived from them, not even that of a "harmonious, consistent whole," which Bradley uses so often. The fundamental ambiguity of Bradley's system

is said to arise from the fact that he maintains a Hegelian concept of thought as dialectic, and, at the same time, tries to apply it to an idea of the Absolute which is not Hegelian, though it might have been suggested by Hegelianism. In other words, the intuition of a unitary whole that at times takes on religious tones, clashes with the method used in analyzing it. If we take the point of view of the absolute experience, it is not evident why it should have a tendency to break up into the ideal and the existential aspects, giving rise to discourse; if we take the point of view of thought, even when we affirm that the unity of terms and relations cannot be "thought out," as Bradley himself says, we must have a certain intellectual understanding of such unity, no matter how dim.

Mr. Antonelli seems to go along with many of Bradley's contemporary critics, with this much of difference, that for them Bradley was not Hegelian enough and for Mr. Antonelli, on the contrary, he was not sufficiently anti-Hegelian. All that could be arrived at through the dialectic of terms and relations would be a logical unity, an abstract totality, which would certainly be immanent; but Bradley's living whole is much more. The shift—or, rather, the passage from the one to the other—is left in obscurity. In other words, Bradley in the actual construction of his metaphysics falls short, by far, of his intuition of the real, which, if followed consistently and unswervingly, would have carried him from idealism to an absolute realism.

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**Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics.** A commentary by the late H. H. Joachim. Ed. by D. A. Rees. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Pp. vi + 304.

This commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, by the editor and translator of the *De Generatione et Corruptione*, was written during the years 1902 to 1917. Joachim was then a fellow of Merton and regularly delivered lectures during that period on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, of which the present book represents the substance. The text of these lectures was laid aside, for some unknown reason, after Joachim's election in 1919 to the Wykeham professorship of logic at Oxford, and he never returned to it again. He died in the summer of 1938. The completed manuscript was discovered after his death, and through the editorial labors of D. A. Rees it is now available to us.

Certainly its publication constitutes a valuable service to Aristotelian scholarship. Joachim was a scholar who was thoroughly and intelligently familiar with the entire Aristotelian corpus, and in addition he possessed an original philosophic mind of considerable acumen. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, as a consequence, is presented in the rich context of Aristotle's whole philosophy. It is impossible in a short review to do more than indicate the fact of the book's solid excellence. There are, of course, many points where one might disagree with Joachim's exegesis, but his point of view is always stimulating and profitable to know.

Some questions might be raised about Mr. Rees's editorial policy, although they could not be satisfactorily answered without firsthand acquaintance with Joachim's manuscript. Mr. Rees took it upon himself to eliminate from the published version Joachim's own philosophical excursions, written from the point of view of the absolute idealism of Joachim's earlier philosophical positions. The reasons for taking this liberty with the original text are not given. It is perhaps true that in this way a greater concentration and economy is achieved. But in a philosopher of Joachim's stature the commentator's own philosophical doctrines and reactions to Aristotle's thought are surely not without interest. They might have shed light on some of the principles and tendencies operative in his exegesis of Aristotle's texts. Less question can be raised about Mr. Rees's addition of supplementary notes mentioning relevant contributions of more recent Aristotelian scholarship and giving references to parallel passages in the *Eudemian Ethics*. (The latter work Joachim seems to have regarded as spurious.) One's curiosity is aroused by Mr. Rees's remark that he omitted passages "where the treatment of points of scholarship has been rendered obsolete by more recent work."

But in any event we can be grateful for the publication of a work which is bound to be so useful, for the understanding not only of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also of Aristotle's entire philosophy.

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***Essay in Politics.*** By Scott Buchanan. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xiii + 236. \$3.75.

More than any other single individual Scott Buchanan can be called the father of the "great books" movement in this country, although his role has been less well publicized than those of Hutchins and Adler. As professor of philosophy at the University of Virginia in the early thirties, Buchanan was largely responsible for building up an important center of graduate studies in philosophy, one in which research in classical metaphysics and Thomism (so conspicuous by their absence in most other secular universities) flourished for several years. Buchanan then became the chief architect of the well-known curriculum organized around the "great books" at Saint John's College in Annapolis. More recently he has served as educational adviser in the new state of Israel. In addition to the present book he is the author of *Possibility, Symbolic Distance*, and *The Doctrine of Signatures*. Buchanan has, therefore, made a significant and substantial contribution to American education. It is less clear, however, whether *Essay in Politics* is a proportionately substantial and significant contribution to political theory.

Taking the proposition that a just government depends upon the consent of the governed as a political first principle, Buchanan holds that the modern world is confronted by a crisis in the consent of the governed. The origins of this crisis are traced back to three great visions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, visions which

brought into being three republics coexisting together uneasily in the same society. The first, whose prophets were Rousseau and Jefferson, was the democratic political republic; the second, prophesied by Adam Smith, was the commercial republic of modern capitalism; the third, of which Marx was the prophet, was the workers' commonwealth. The tensions among the three have ultimately produced a kind of schizophrenic dissociation of personality in the political order. (This metaphor is one that Buchanan does not himself employ, but I believe it conveys his general meaning.) The fragmentation of political personality has become increasingly severe, with all kinds of lesser republics being produced. The general task of *Essay in Politics* seems to be that of the restoration of some kind of internal order, harmony, and unity making for political health.

According to Buchanan, many of our modern frustrations are due to "an almost complete acquiescence to many unrecognized governments, among which are the corporations that carry on our vital functions." Each individual belongs in varying degrees to many corporations, ranging from small business or academic ones to nation-states. The difficulty is that our acquiescence and consent in these bodies politic to which we belong is almost unthinking and inarticulate. This is the "crisis in consent." Buchanan proposes that we recognize these invisible governments as bodies politic and make our consent (or dissent) articulate. Society, now fragmented and torn by a kind of continuous civil war, would be reknit into organic unity by becoming a kind of federal republican union of corporations. A new kind of "federal union now" is being proposed, a United Nations which would include many bodies politic which up to now have not been properly recognized for what they are.

To this reviewer both the diagnosis and the suggested therapy for our modern political ills to be found in *Essay in Politics* have a kind of frustrating vagueness. It is, I take it, a commonplace that in a politically healthy society there will be a rational order of the parts of that society to each other and to the whole. Among those parts will certainly be those which Buchanan regards as constituting in our period invisible governments. Aristotle would have regarded them as imperfect societies, and in this light their political status would have been judged. From Buchanan's *Essay* it is far from clear how a just political order is to be achieved by making them into relatively sovereign political commonwealths, more or less loosely organized into a federation of republics. Buchanan has not made clear what (if any) principles of hierarchical political ordering might be operative. One can agree with Buchanan that the consent (and dissent) of a citizen should be articulate, responsible, and reasonable. But what "the new ways of consent" are which are to bring us a new political liberty is a question largely left unanswered in *Essay in Politics*.

The style in which the book is written is another source of difficulty, at least to this reader. While there are many passages whose phrasing is elegant and felicitous, there are also many where a clear meaning seems to vanish under close analysis. Often metaphors seem to become

a bit confused and confusing. Mr. Buchanan, like Heraclitus and the Cumaeian Sybil, writes in a highly oracular style. And just as the difficulties of interpreting the Cumaeian Sybil were compounded by the leaves of prophecy being scattered by the wind, in the same way the prophetic insights of *Essay in Politics* sometimes seem to lack intelligible connection. But still many of these insights are interesting, since they are the product of an interesting mind.

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***De Natura Materiae.* Attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas. Ed. by Joseph M. Wyss. Fribourg: Société Philosophique; Louvain: Editions E. Nauwelaerts, 1953. Pp. 135.**

This is the third text published in the Fribourg series; Father Wyser and Dr. Pauson have done, respectively, St. Thomas's commentary on *De Trinitate* and *De Principiis Naturae*. The present opusculum is one of a group of nine works of St. Thomas considered authentic by some scholars (M. Grabmann, J. F. Rossi) and rejected by others (P. Mandonnet and now by this editor, Wyss). In general the handling of this text follows the style used by John Pauson in his edition. It has a good introduction, bibliography, and indices.

Whoever wrote *De Natura Materiae* (and I do not think it was St. Thomas Aquinas) was much concerned about Averroes's theory of individuation by matter plus interminate dimensions; three chapters out of five are devoted to fighting this theory. We also find in the opusculum the view that several substantial forms are present in man and higher animals *essentially* but not with a distinct *esse*. It is very difficult to understand how St. Thomas could write this sort of thing, particularly if *De Natura Materiae* is considered to be a sequel to *De Principiis Naturae*. In a curious remark in the introduction (p. 76) we are told that the "edition" of Mandonnet is the "most truly representative non-critical text" of the opusculum. I see no difference between the text printed under Mandonnet's name and that of the Parma edition (XVI, 343-52).

VERNON J. BOURKE

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***Thomas von Aquin. Lebensgang und Lebenswerk des Fürsten der Scholastik.* By Angelus Walz, O.P. Basel: Thomas-Morus-Verlag, 1953. Pp. 153.**

Since an English translation of Father Walz's Italian life of St. Thomas Aquinas has recently appeared, it is not necessary to discuss the present work at great length. Father Walz's German book is much the same biography that has been favorably reviewed before. Some new things are found in the present version, however. The chronological table of writings (*Zeittafel*, printed on a separate folding sheet) has been revised somewhat; *Quodlibeta VII-IX* are now dated 1256-59 instead of 1265-67; *Compendium Theologiae* is now dated 1266 instead of 1268-73; the nine debatable *opuscula*, headed by

*De Natura Materiae*, are now listed *probabiliter spuria* whereas previously they were *incerti temporis* and apparently accepted under the influence of Grabmann. Several recent studies of the life of Aquinas are noticed for the first time in the German text. The one that has me puzzled—Father J. Abate's suggestion that St. Thomas was born about 1220 (because the statutes of the University of Paris required him to be thirty-five years of age in 1255 to receive the doctorate [see *Miscellanea Francescana*, L (1950), 231-47])—is curtly dismissed in one sentence (p. 10). The only criticism that I have of the German text is that the excellent footnotes of the Italian have been practically all omitted. In whatever language one chooses to read it, Father Walz's life of St. Thomas is still the most factual and sensible work on the subject.

VERNON J. BOURKE

*Saint Louis University*

***Problematica interna dello spiritualismo cristiano.*** By N. Incardona. Milan: Edit. Bocca, 1952. Pp. 204.

In recent years the name "Christian spiritualism" has been used to designate one of the most influential currents of Italian thought. Under such a name are grouped many thinkers whose background widely differs and whose positions also show remarkable divergences. Some of the "spiritualists" have been strongly influenced by modernism and Blondel's philosophy of action; others moved from Gentile's idealism to a form of Christian philosophy. In general they all hold that philosophy should not be limited to a critique of knowledge, but developed into a metaphysics; that a thorough-going immanentism leads to contradictions; that the demands of our moral consciousness must not be overlooked, and that it is the task of the philosopher to provide satisfactory answers to them. But even these common tenets are upheld for different reasons and reached through lines of thought which but seldom coincide. It is therefore quite difficult to give a picture of Christian spiritualism which would be at once comprehensive and detailed; and, in practice, anyone who tries to do so is faced by the alternative of either patching together a series of essays with very little continuity or dealing with only one author who is deemed to be the most representative. Mr. Incardona largely took to the latter course and singled out the philosophy of Mr. Sciacca as the main topic of his book, with only scanty references to other spiritualist thinkers. Of course, any such choice is bound to be more or less arbitrary. That Mr. Sciacca is the most significant spiritualist philosopher remains therefore open to question.

Mr. Incardona points out that the spiritualists' metaphysics is grounded on a phenomenology. More than a passive contemplation of essences, as it was in Husserl, phenomenology in this new context turns out to be a reflection on our knowing act whereby the subject becomes conscious of itself and of the world, offered to it as the object of its act. So experience is not, primarily, exterior experience; the knowledge of objects depends on the light of consciousness, which

enables man to know. A description of inner experience is the new viewpoint, which allows philosophy to meet the critical requirements stressed by modern thought since Descartes without getting entangled in any form of absolute rationalism.

It is a common claim of the spiritualists that their philosophy fully brings out the original meaning and speculative implications of Christianity. Christianity first introduced the concept of person, which had been almost completely neglected by the Greek metaphysicians. The main problem both for Plato and Aristotle, is to find an explanation for the many things of the world and an ultimate, unmoved source of the many movements. The great advance achieved by Christianity is an understanding of the personal character of God and His relation to the world as a free act of creation and conservation. These traits cannot be fitted into Aristotle's conception of God and metaphysics, which are labeled by Sciacca as "naturalistic."

As a consequence, the concept of being as being is played down, and for it a concrete consideration of the spiritual life is substituted, which shapes up as a metaphysics of truth. By "person," in Sciacca's thought, is meant, over and above the composition of soul and body and the feeling of such a union, the inner presence and grasp of truth. Here we find Sciacca at variance, once again, with neo-Scholasticism and most of modern philosophy. Usually the problem of truth is related exclusively to the judging or discursive power; and truth is taken to mean the correspondence of our concepts to reality, or some kind of interior consistency among our judgments. For Sciacca, the discursive activity of the mind uses the truth, but does not produce it; on the other hand, it would be impossible to derive truth from concepts, because concepts are the outcome of our discursive power, and their priority to it is only seeming. A concept, according to Sciacca (who draws heavily, at this point, on Rosmini's theory of judgment) is the fusion of an image, furnished by the senses, with the notion of being, which is supplied by a judgment. Sciacca is therefore led to admit a superior activity of the mind, of an intuitive kind, which is capable of grasping truth and handing it down, so to say, to the discursive power. Both epistemology and metaphysics are grounded on such intuition—epistemology, because by the presence of truth the mind is enabled to distinguish true from false judgments, and the value of knowledge is guaranteed; metaphysics, because every demonstration implies discourse, and, in particular, the proof of God's existence, which is the core of metaphysics, is implicitly contained in the very presence of truth to the mind. Reason, taken as inclusive of both discourse and intuition, is by its very nature open to transcendence; it is, to use Sciacca's own word, "theistic."

With these conclusions of Sciacca not all the spiritualists agree. The closest seems to be Guzzo. Stefanini would maintain that a critical metaphysics cannot start but from our inner consciousness, though he would not go along with Sciacca in the analysis of it. Lazzarini, Carlini, and Battaglia would emphasize much more the role of moral and religious experience in setting up a metaphysics.

Mr. Incardona's book gives a very good account of Sciacca's philosophy, tracing back the origin of the problems to the cultural situation of Italy in the early thirties. Although at times a little too enthusiastic, it would prove most helpful as an introduction to a more detailed study of Christian spiritualism and the various directions it has taken in its development.

FRANCO CALETTI

*Saint Louis University*

***Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science (1100-1700).*** By A. C. Crombie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. ix + 369. \$7.00.

It was for a long time commonly believed and taught that both the experimental method and the theory which rationalized that method were discovered in the 16th and 17th centuries of the present era. Bacon had said "nullius vestigia sequutus," Descartes had explicitly rejected the syllogistic methods of the schoolmen and Bacon and Descartes were taken at their words. The researches into the antique and medieval origins of modern thought which began seriously in the 19th century and have continued until the present, have, to a large extent, undermined the extravagant claims of novelty which were characteristic of the founders of modern science. Professor Crombie's book places before us a mountain of evidence that the theory and practice of science in the 17th century had its origins in "the strategic act by which Grosseteste and his thirteenth and fourteenth century successors created modern experimental science by "uniting the experimental habit of the practical arts with the rationalism of twelfth-century philosophy."<sup>1</sup> Putting the thesis more broadly, it is that, "The history of the theory of experimental science from Grosseteste to Newton is in fact a set of variations on Aristotle's theme, that the purpose of scientific enquiry was to discover true premisses for demonstrated knowledge of observation, bringing in the new instrument of experiment and transferring into the key of mathematics."<sup>2</sup>

Though several chapters are devoted to the philosophical and scientific works of Robert Grosseteste, the work is actually a history of theories about method in natural science and of several illustrations of the applications of such theories. The first important Latin commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* was written by Grosseteste, and it is with the exposition of this commentary that Crombie is first concerned. After a chapter on 12th century science, we are given a thorough and accurate account of Grosseteste's theory of method (Ch. III, IV). Many crucial passages are carefully translated and usually the original texts are given in the notes. But Crombie does much more than simply permit the Bishop of Lincoln to speak for himself. He explains the passages and relates them with Aristotelian, Galenic, Islamic antecedents. Then some applications of the theory to physical problems are

<sup>1</sup>P. 10.

<sup>2</sup>P. 318.

set forth in detail (Ch. V) and the remainder of the book (Ch. VI-XI) traces the influence of Grosseteste's methodological and scientific writings on later medieval and early modern thought. It is not, nor is it intended to be, a history of medieval science. But it is intended to be, and largely succeeds in being, a history of certain central scientific concerns, viz., the nature of scientific method and some applications of a theory about scientific method.

Professor Crombie has studied the literature relating to his subject with remarkable thoroughness, and he gives in the footnotes full information. Anyone wishing to study medieval science will find this book an invaluable source for guidance and reference.

Now there is no doubt, as I think, that Professor Crombie has demonstrated the continuity of method and theory of method which has continued from the time of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* until the beginning of experimental science in the modern sense of the term. Yet, although it is recognized that changes in this method and its rationalization occurred in the process which are of the profoundest importance, there are two questions which Professor Crombie does not sufficiently consider. On the answers to these questions depends any definitive evaluation of the medieval contribution to the theory of scientific method. The first question is the extent to which the Aristotelian theory of method actually directed the researches of the medieval natural scientists and mathematicians. The second question is whether the Aristotelian theory of method sustained and accelerated or retarded the growth of scientific ideas and practice.

With regard to the first question I believe that Professor Crombie has documented and sustained his thesis very well. The main scientific problem the history of which Crombie traces in greatest detail is the explanation of the rainbow. Here there is little doubt that Theodoric of Freiberg is consciously proceeding along lines of explanation and theories of explanation which have their origin in Aristotle's scientific and logical writings. The same can be said about Grosseteste's explanation of heat as a form of motion. Although the results achieved here are not remarkable, they are, in principle and detail, as good as Francis Bacon's account of the same problem.

Nor is this all. I believe that the historical connections which are established or suggested in this book between the medieval and the 17th century scientists and logicians make some of the work of Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes much more intelligible. Yet it seems to me that there is a danger in depending too heavily on such connections, genuine as they are. Many factors have contributed toward the growth of natural science, and it must be admitted that the preservation and use of Greek mathematical, optical, and statical treatises probably played a more important role than the logical writings of Aristotle in the development of science after the ancient period.

As to the other question, whether the Aristotelian doctrine of scientific method retarded or accelerated scientific advance, it has to be admitted that in some cases it sustained and in others retarded it. I believe that Professor Crombie understands this very well, but he does not always state the point as definitely as at least one reader

would like. The relation between mathematical and physical statements was, I think, not well-understood by most medieval writers, and many of the early modern philosophers and scientific writers of the 17th century appear to be confused on some aspects of this delicate question. Now this was due, as I also think, to certain metaphysical presuppositions which lie at the foundation of Aristotle's beliefs about method. According to some medieval philosophers, these metaphysical principles can be established conclusively and without logical dependence on the results of the natural sciences. In any case, the theory of method advanced by Aristotle and his medieval followers is entirely unpleasible without the metaphysical assumptions. And if Crombie is right in suggesting that scientific theories<sup>3</sup> tell us no more than that "the experimental facts may be related in a particular manner," it must be insisted that the medieval theory of method involves a very considerable metaphysics without which it can neither be used nor understood. Those who believe that metaphysics to be mistaken in principle will take a correspondingly dim view of the basic fruitfulness of the method of research which is erected on such a foundation. It is possible to be very specific on this point. It is clear that Grosseteste took the line about causation to be found in Aristotle (*Post. An.*, II, ch. 16-18) that, In a genuine principle of science, the cause and effect reciprocate. I suppose that this was held to be true because the nature of the effect depends on that of the cause so that specifically distinct causes still constitute some genus, i.e., those things capable of producing the sort of effect in question. This principle, ultimately derived from metaphysics, is quite consistent with our tentative acceptance of many specifically distinct causes of a given sort of effect. For this is but the well-known argument from signs and symptoms in lieu of genuine causes. Yet the statements made by Crombie and by some of the scholastics whom he quotes are not entirely unambiguous in this regard. In the case of Ockham this ambiguity is especially vexing. In the *Summa Logicae* III, II, p. 10, Ockham appears to follow Aristotle, but in *Sent.*, *Prol.*, q. 2 and *quodl.*, his examples strongly suggest a real plurality of causes. On one interpretation, we might have a genuine plurality of causes. But, if so, the method plainly breaks down. (See G. H. von Wright on this). Indeed, I am inclined to think that a careful logical analysis of the method as it is set forth in Ockham's writings would reveal some radical deficiencies even if the metaphysics on which it depends is accepted.

However, whether the method is logically sound or not, it is historically and doctrinally connected with the methods advocated by Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes. And we are profoundly indebted to the patient and able scholarship of Professor Crombie for making these things clear to us.

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# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books Received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ADAMS, HENRY CARTER. *Relation of the State to Industrial Action and Economics and Jurisprudence*. Ed. with introd. and notes by Joseph Dorfman. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; April, 1954. Pp. 288. \$4.00.

AHMAD, HAZRAT MIRZA GHULAM. *The Philosophy of the Teachings of Islam*. Washington: American Fazl Mosque, 1953. Pp. 199. \$3.50.

ANSCHUTZ, R. P. *The Philosophy of J. S. Mill*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; April, 1954. Pp. 184. \$3.00.

ARBER, AGNES. *Mind and the Eye*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; March, 1954. \$3.00.

ARISTOTLE. *Aristotle on the Art of Fiction*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 93. Paper, \$1.25.

—. *The Ethics of Aristotle*. Tr. from the Greek by J. A. K. Thomson. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 289. \$3.25.

ASCHENBRENNER, KARL, and HOLTHER, WILLIAM B. *Reflections on Poetry*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; April, 1954. Pp. 152. \$3.50.

ASHER, ESTON JACKSON; TIFFIN, JOSEPH; and KNIGHT, FREDERIC B. *Introduction to General Psychology*. Chicago: D. C. Heath & Co., 1953. Pp. 531. \$4.50.

AUGUSTINE, ST. *Confessions*. Tr. by Vernon J. Bourke. New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1953. Pp. xxxii + 481. \$5.00.

This translation is based on the Latin text of Martin Skutella. The translator has aimed at a faithful, yet idiomatic, translation and has tried as much as possible to retain the Augustinian style and word-play. The notes are fuller than one would expect in a translation; they clarify St. Augustine's oblique references and give brief explanations of philosophical terms. The introduction, though brief, gives an account of St. Augustine's life and the influence of the *Confessions*.

There are a selected bibliography and an index.

- AYER, A. J. *Philosophical Essays*. New York: St. Martin's Press; April, 1954. \$4.50.
- BARRELL, JOSEPH. *Philosophical Study of the Human Mind*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; April, 1954. \$6.00.
- BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. *Inquiry into Inquiries*. Boston: Beacon Press; May, 1954. \$6.00.
- BENTLEY, JOHN E. *Outline-History of Philosophy*. Rev. ed. Patterson: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Feb., 1954. \$1.50.
- BERDYAEV, NICOLAS ALEKSANDROVICH. *Truth and Revelation*. Tr. from the Russian by R. M. French. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 156. \$2.50.
- BERGSON, HENRI. *Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; March, 1954. 85¢
- BLACK, MAX. *Semantics and Logic*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press; April, 1954. \$5.00.
- BLACKHAM, H. J. *The Human Tradition*. Boston: Beacon Press; Feb., 1954. \$3.00.
- BLACKHURST, J. HERBERT. *Body-Mind and Creativity*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. 186. \$3.00.
- This is an elementary exposition of "dialectical" materialistic monism in dialogue form. The author sets up this materialism as the only alternative to idealism and neorealism. He then sets out to show that these systems are illogical or not in harmony with experience. This position taken, he amplifies his notion that the materialistic view of man gives man the highest possible place in the universe, instead of subordinating (and thus demeaning) man to any other being. He also claims that this system is the best support for democracy and progressive education.
- BONAVENTURA, ST. *The Mind's Road to God*. Tr. with an introd. by George Boas. "The Library of Liberal Arts," No. 32. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. xxi + 46. Paper, 50¢
- This little work has always been held in high esteem, and the translator has shown an understanding of St. Bonaventure in choosing this work for translation. The translation is careful and smooth, though there are some sentences that read awkwardly.
- The introduction is another matter. The translator is obviously sincere in his sympathy and admiration for St. Bonaventure, but he is not equally sure in his interpretation. The confusion is increased when he compares St. Bonaventure with Plotinus, and again, when, to illustrate St. Bonaventure's conception of experimental knowledge, he uses a distinction taken from Cardinal Newman.
- BOUSCAREN, ANTHONY TRAWICK. *America Faces World Communism*. Introd. by George Creel. New York: Vantage Press, 1953. Pp. 204. \$3.00.
- BRAITHWAITE, RICHARD BEVAN. *Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; May, 1954. Pp. xi + 375. \$8.00.
- BRINTON, CLARENCE CRANE. *The Shaping of the Modern Mind*. New York: New American Lib., 1953. Pp. 287. Paper, 35¢
- BROWN, FRANCIS J. (ed.). *University and World Understanding: Report of a Conference of Fulbright Scholars on Education*. Washington: American Council on Education; Jan., 1954. \$1.50.
- BROWN, KENNETH IRVING. *Not Minds Alone. Some Frontiers of Christian Education*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. xv + 206. \$3.00.

This book is an attempt to present some of the author's convictions in relation to the place of religion in education. A former college president and now executive director of the Danforth Foundation, he speaks from wide experience. In many ways this is a stimulating and helpful book. Its most serious defect is considering Christianity from the "least common denominator" point of view. Thus, in spite of the great amount of factual knowledge possessed by the author and his evident sincerity, an impression of ineffectiveness is left.

BURGESS, ROBERT. *Platonism in Desportes*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press; April, 1954. \$2.50.

BURNABY, J. *Education, Religion, Learning and Research*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 25. Paper, 50¢

BURROW, TRIGANT. *Science and Man's Behavior*. Ed. by William E. Galt. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. 576. \$6.00.

CAMUS, ALBERT. *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Jan., 1954. \$4.00.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. Tr. and ed. by Peter Gay. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1954. Pp. 150. \$2.75.

CASTELL, ALBUREY. *Science as a Goad to Philosophy*. "College of the Pacific, Philosophy Institute Publications," Vol. III. Stockton, Calif.: College of the Pacific, 1953. Pp. 103. Paper, \$1.25.

This is the "Tully Cleon Knoles Lecture in Philosophy" for 1953. In opposition to theories which make philosophy irrelevant to human life and scientific thinking or reduce it to science (scientism), the author maintains that persons can be driven into philosophical thinking by the problems they encounter in science. He is concerned to maintain the distinction and autonomy of philosophy, though not its separation from other fields of knowledge. After a general presentation of this point, he takes up three specific areas in which people are goaded into philosophical thinking: the notions of purpose, freedom, and moral value. In these areas the author shows that scientism and many forms of philosophical analysis (logical empiricism) are thinly disguised philosophical theories, which, considered in their presuppositions and consequences, "price themselves out of the philosophical market" (cf. pp. 69-70).

CHILDS, MARQUIS W., and CATER, DOUGLASS. *Ethics in a Business Society*. New York: Harper & Bros.; March, 1954. \$2.50.

COHEN, MORRIS R. *American Thought: A Critical Sketch*. Glencoe: Free Press; Feb., 1954. \$5.00.

—. *Reason and Nature*. Rev. ed. Glencoe: Free Press, 1953. Pp. 494. \$6.00.

COLLINS, JAMES. *A History of Modern European Philosophy*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1954. Pp. 850. \$9.75.

CONANT, JAMES BRYANT (ed.). *Pasteur's and Tyndall's Study of Spontaneous Generation*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 61. Paper, \$1.25.

CONGAR, IVES M.-J., O.P. *The Catholic Church and the Race Question*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 62. 40¢

COPI, IRVING M. *Symbolic Logic*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. xiii + 355. \$5.00.

This is an introductory classroom text. It intends to do two things: to introduce the student to the art of handling symbolic logic and to acquaint him with logical systems. The first five chapters take up the elements of symbolic logic, compound statements, implication,

truth tables, deduction, propositional functions and quantifiers, and the logic of relations. Chapters six to nine give deductive systems, a propositional calculus, alternative systems and notations, and a first-order function calculus. One appendix treats of the algebra of classes, a second of the ramified theory of types. There is an index.

COSTELLO, HARRY T. *Philosophy of the Real and Possible*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1954. \$2.75.

CROMBIE, A. C. *Augustine to Galileo. The History of Science, A.D. 400-1650*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xv + 436. \$8.00.

First published in Great Britain in 1952, this study is of great interest and value. The importance of the book lies not so much in original contributions, as in bringing together and making available in English the results of a great number of specialized studies which were often hidden away in journals difficult of access.

The author's view is that the development of scientific ideas is due not so much to the discovery of new facts as to a change in the way of looking at the same facts. And these changes themselves are usually prepared for by tentative partial efforts in the same direction. Moreover, the author has a clear idea of the operational and constructural nature of modern scientific thinking.

CRONBACH, LEE. *Educational Psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Feb., 1954. \$7.50.

DANTZIG, TOBIAS. *Henri Poincaré*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; April, 1954. \$2.50.

DAVY, NORMAN (ed.). *British Scientific Literature in the 17th Century*. New York: Barnes & Noble; March, 1954. \$2.50.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *Medieval Essays*. New York: Sheed & Ward; Feb., 1954. \$3.50.

DEFERRARI, ROY J., and BARRY, SR. M. INVOLATA, C.D.P., in collaboration with MCGUINNESS, IGNATIUS, O.P. *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Fascicle V, R-Z. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. 935-1185. Paper, \$12.50.

This is the final fascicle of the *Lexicon*, publication of which was begun in 1949. As a reference work, it should be available in the library of every school which teaches the philosophy or theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. The work is modeled somewhat on Schutz's *Thomaslexikon*, with a greater emphasis on English explanations of technical terms.

DEL VECCHIO, GIORGIO. *Justice*. Tr. by Lady Guthrie. Ed. with additional notes by A. H. Campbell. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xxi + 236. \$6.00.

Del Vecchio is one of the best-known Continental writers on legal philosophy. Only a few of his works have already appeared in English, and so this work is a welcome addition. Del Vecchio is sometimes considered a Kantian or a neo-Kantian, though he has undergone strong Hegelian influence which gives his philosophy a strongly idealist (or "spiritualist") turn.

The present book begins with a historical study of the concept of justice, from primitive mythological thinking to the present. There follow various analyses of justice: its relation to consciousness, its logical elements, the various divisions of justice, formal and material law.

The translation is excellent and has been carefully checked by several scholars. The work is richly documented, and there are indices of subjects and of authors.

DE RAEYMAEKER, LOUIS. *The Philosophy of Being. A Synthesis of Metaphysics.* Tr. by Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer, S.J. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1954. Pp. xii + 360. \$4.95.

This translation has been made from the revised edition of *Philosophie de l'être*, published in 1947. The translation is smooth and faithful.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part takes up being and the problem of metaphysics, together with the analogy, unity, and intelligibility of being. The second part deals with the internal structure of particular being. The third part gives the causal explanation of being and ends with a treatment of the creative cause.

DESEN, WILFRID. *Tragic Finale: An Essay in the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; May, 1954. \$4.50.

DEWITT, NORMAN W. *Epicurus and His Philosophy.* Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press; Feb., 1954. \$6.00.

DONCEEL, JOSEPH, S.J. *Philosophy of Psychology.* New York: Sheed & Ward; April, 1954. Prob. \$4.50.

DUHEM, PIERRE. *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.* Tr. by Philip P. Wiener. Foreword by Prince Louis de Broglie. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. xxii + 344. \$6.00.

First published in 1906, this work remains one of the great classics of the philosophy of science. Duhem's work has influenced almost all later writing in that field and yet is still stimulating and full of very worth-while material. It is not out of place to note that Duhem's philosophy of science has often been unfairly handled, as well by those who claim to follow it as by its opponents.

The translator has done the great favor of adding an index to the English version.

DURKHEIM, DAVID EMILE. *Sociology and Philosophy.* Tr. from the French by D. F. Pocock; introd. by J. G. Peristiany. Glencoe: Free Press, 1953. Pp. 138. \$2.50.

EWING, ALFRED CYRIL. *Ethics.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 190. \$1.50.

FECHER, CHARLES A. *The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain.* Westminster: Newman Press. Pp. 375. \$5.00.

FERGUSON, JOHN B. *Substitutes for the Strike.* Hawaii: Univ. of Hawaii, 1953. Pp. 14. Paper, apply.

FREUD, SIGMUND. *On Aphasia.* Tr. from the German by E. Stengel. New York: International Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 120. \$3.00.

—. *The Origins of Psychoanalysis.* Ed. by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris. New York: Basic Books; May, 1954. Pp. 512. \$7.50.

FRONDIZI, RISIERI. *The Nature of the Self: A Functional Interpretation.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; May, 1954. Pp. xi + 210. \$4.00.

GEDDES, DONALD PORTER (ed.). *An Analysis of the Kinsey Reports.* New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; April, 1954. \$3.50.

GILLIN, JOHN (ed.). *For a Science of Social Man.* New York: Macmillan Co.; Feb., 1954. \$3.50.

GRAY, CHRISTOPHER. *Cubist Aesthetic Theories.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953. Pp. 190. \$4.50.

HAKE, EDWARD. *Epieikeia.* Ed. by E. C. Yale. Preface by Samuel E. Thorne. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 181. Paper, \$2.50.

HARDING, DENYS WYATT. *Social Psychology and Individual Values.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954. Pp. 184. \$2.40.

- HARVEY, PAUL. *Autumn of Liberty*. Introd. by John L. Lewis. Garden City: Hanover House, 1954. Pp. 192. \$2.00.
- HAZARD, PAUL. *European Thought in the 18th Century*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; June, 1954. \$6.00.
- HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH. *Reason in History*. Tr. from the German by Robert S. Hartman. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953. Pp. 137. Paper, 75¢
- HERACLITUS. *Cosmic Fragments of Heraclitus*. Ed. by G. S. Kirk. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; April, 1954. \$11.50.
- HERING, JEAN. *Good and a Bad Government*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas; May, 1954. \$2.75.
- HIGHET, GILBERT. *Man's Unconquerable Mind*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; March, 1954. Pp. x + 138. \$2.75.
- HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *Experiment in Education*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; April, 1954. \$5.00.
- HOHLENBERG, JOHANNES. *Søren Kierkegaard*. Tr. by T. H. Croxall. New York: Pantheon Books; Feb., 1954. \$5.00.
- HOROWITZ, IRVING L. *Claude Helvetius: Philosopher of Democracy and Enlightenment*. New York: Paine-Whitman Publs., 1954. Pp. 196. \$3.00.
- This study of one of the minor eighteenth-century French thinkers is a useful addition to the relatively scanty English material available. There is a certain amount of information and documentation which any student will be glad to accept. The rather crude materialism and utilitarianism of Helvetius and the Marxist interpretation of the author of the present book are so blatant that they could mislead only the most immature of readers.
- HUME, DAVID. *David Hume's Political Essays*. Ed. by Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953. Pp. 230. Paper, 75¢
- HUTCHINS, ROBERT MAYNARD. *The University of Utopia*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. 112. \$2.50.
- Impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The*. Rev. ed. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 59. Paper, 25¢
- JARRETT-KERR, MARTIN. *Francois Mauriac*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; May, 1954. \$2.50.
- JARRETT, JAMES, JR., and McMURRIN, STERLING. *Readings in Contemporary Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; May, 1954. \$6.50.
- JASPERS, KARL. *Reason and Existence*. Tr. from the German by William Earle. New York: Noonday Press; April, 1954. \$3.00.
- Jurisprudence in Action*. Legal Essays selected by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Post-Admission Legal Education. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1953. Pp. 506. \$5.75.
- KAMIAT, ARNOLD H. *Ethics of Civilization*. Washington: Public Affairs Press; March, 1954. \$2.50.
- KENNY, JOHN P. *Medical Ethics Workbook*. Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. Pp. 113. Paper, \$2.00.
- KOCHER, PAUL H. *Science and Religion in Elizabethan England*. San Marino: Huntington Lib.; June, 1954. Pp. xii + 340. \$6.00.
- KRUTCH, JOSEPH WOOD. *The Measure of Man*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill; March, 1954. \$3.50.
- LEITES, NATHAN. *A Study of Bolshevism*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1953. Pp. 639. \$6.50.
- LENZEN, VICTOR F. *Causality in Natural Science*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1953. Pp. vii + 121. \$3.00.
- This study of causality in natural science shows an acquaintance with modern discussions of the topic and a good awareness of the

problems involved. The author divides the topic into seven chapters: the nature of causality, the principle of causality, cognition of causality, causality in classical physics, causality in biology, causality and relativity, causality and quanta. The author makes a clear distinction between the ordinary "common sense" view of causality and that which obtains in natural science. Unfortunately—and this is in spite of his acquaintance with modern sources—the author does not offer a third; namely, the philosophical understanding of causality. Hence there is an inadequacy and an ambiguity in his first two chapters. Once the author has come to the scientific view of causality as uniformity or regularity (and identity or equality), he divides it into dynamical and statistical, reserving to the former the notion of efficacy.

There are a bibliography and an index.

- LEVENSON, JOSEPH R. *Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 268. \$4.00.
- LINDBERG, JOHN. *Foundations of Social Survival*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. viii + 260. \$3.50.
- LIPSKY, GEORGE A. (ed.). *Law and Politics in the World Community*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1953. Pp. 393. \$6.00.
- LIPSON, LESLIE. *The Great Issues of Politics*. New York: Prentice-Hall; March, 1954. Pp. 480. \$7.00.
- LOCKE, JOHN. *Two Treatises of Civil Government*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1953. \$1.65.
- LOSSKY, N. *Analytic and Synthetic Propositions and Mathematical Logic*. New York: International Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 16. 75¢
- LUBAC, HENRI DE, S.J. *Aspects of Buddhism*. New York: Sheed & Ward; Feb., 1954. \$3.00.
- MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW. *Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; March, 1954. 85¢
- MASARYK, T. G. *Spirit of Russia*. 2 vols. Ed. by J. Slavik. New York: Macmillan Co.; April, 1954. \$13.50 set.
- MASON, STEPHEN S. *Main Currents of Scientific Thought*. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1953. Pp. 528. \$5.00.
- MATES, BENSON. *Stoic Logic*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Feb., 1954. Pp. 148. Paper, \$2.25.
- MAYER, CHARLES. *In Quest of a New Ethics*. Boston: Beacon Press; Feb., 1954. \$4.00.
- MCGILL, V. J. *Emotions and Reason*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas; April, 1954. \$3.25.
- MCKEON, RICHARD P. *Thought, Action, and Passion*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; April, 1954. \$5.00.
- MCLAUGHLIN, P. J. *Modern Science and God*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1954. \$3.75.
- Mediaeval Studies*. Volume XV (1953). Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1953. Pp. 289. Paper, \$7.00.

As every scholar has long known, the volumes of *Mediaeval Studies* contain many valuable articles and texts. In the present volume there are four articles of special interest to philosophers. "St. Bonaventure, St. Francis, and Philosophy," by Anton C. Pegis (pp. 1-13), takes up a topic which has been actively controverted in recent years and proposes a delicately nuanced and well-documented solution. "The Personal Letters between Abelard and Heloise: Introduction, Authenticity and Text," by J. T. Muckle, C.S.B. (pp. 47-94), casts serious doubt on letters hitherto considered authentic. "Essence

and *Esse* according to Jean Quidort," by Ambrose J. Heiman, C.P.P.S. (pp. 137-46), is another in the series of studies of the meaning of these terms in medieval philosophers. "The Similarities between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on the Metaphysics* and the Anonymous *Commentary on the Physics* attributed to Siger of Brabant," by William Dunphy (pp. 159-68), is an important piece of evidence that may be sometime used to help in dis-solving the ambiguities surrounding Siger of Brabant.

There are several short notes of philosophical interest. M. Etienne Gilson, in "Note sur le *Revelabile* selon Cajétan" (pp. 199-206), analyzes Cajetan's doctrine on this important point. "A Hitherto Unknown Commentary on Boethius' *De Hebdomadibus* Written by Clarenbaldus of Arras," by N. M. Haring, S.A.C. (pp. 212-21), discusses authenticity and doctrine, and gives additional variants for Jansen's text of Clarenbaldus's *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate*.

Finally, Nicolas M. Haring, S.A.C., edits the text of a Latin dialogue on the doctrine of Gilbert of Poitiers (pp. 243-89).

MORAIN, LLOYD and MARY. *Humanism as the Next Step*. Boston: Beacon Press; Feb., 1954.

MUNIZ, FRANCISCO P., O.P. *The Work of Theology*. Tr. by John P. Reid, O.P. Washington: Thomist Press, 1954. Pp. 42. Paper, 60¢

This is a traditional presentation of theology as wisdom. The author mentions and criticizes many "modern" concepts of theology (without even identifying most of them).

MURRAY, A. R. M. *An Introduction to Political Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. \$4.75.

MURRAY, GILBERT. *Hellenism and the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press; Feb., 1954. \$1.50.

NOTCUTT, BERNARD. *The Psychology of Personality*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 259. \$4.75.

OLIVER, REVILIO P. *Niccolo Perotti's Version of the Enchiridion of Epictetus*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press; Feb., 1954. \$4.00.

O'NEILL, JAMES M. *Catholics in Controversy*. New York: McMullen Books; April, 1954. \$3.00.

OUTLER, ALBERT C. *Psychotherapy and the Christian Message*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. 286. \$3.50.

PAINE, THOMAS. *Common Sense and Other Political Writings*. Ed. by Nelson F. Adkins. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953. Pp. 237. Paper, 75¢

PAPPAS, ANDREAS S. *Man and His World*. New York: Vantage Press, 1954. \$2.50.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. *Essays in Sociological Theory*. Rev. ed. Glencoe: Free Press, 1954. \$6.00.

PERRY, RALPH BARTON. *Realms of Value*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Feb., 1954. \$7.50.

PLATO. *Last Days of Socrates*. Tr. by H. Tredennick. Baltimore: Penguin Books; March, 1954. 50¢

POUND, ROSCOE. *Introduction to the Philosophy of Law*. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Jan., 1954. \$3.50.

*Public Education under Criticism*. Ed. by C. W. Scott and C. M. Hill. New York: Prentice-Hall; Jan., 1954. Pp. 419. \$6.35.

RAVEN, CHARLES EARLE. *Natural Religion and Christian Theology*. "The Gifford Lectures," 1952. Second series: Experience and Interpretation. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; April, 1953. Pp. vii + 224. \$4.00.

- REAVER, J. RUSSELL. *Emerson as Myth-Maker*. Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press; May, 1954. \$2.75.
- ROBACK, A. A. *Destiny and Motivation in Language*. Cambridge: Sci-Art Pubs., 1954. Pp. 474. \$8.50.
- ROSE, ARNOLD M. *Theory and Method in the Social Sciences*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press; March, 1954. \$4.00.
- RUBY, LIONEL. *How To Think Logically*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.; May, 1954. \$3.50.
- RYAN, JOHN K. *Basic Principles and Problems of Philosophy*. Westminster: Newman Press, 1954. \$2.50.
- SAMUEL, OTTO. *A Foundation of Ontology. A Critical Analysis of Nicolai Hartmann*. Tr. by Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xv + 155. \$3.75.

Nicolai Hartmann was an important figure in the return to a kind of realism and the study of essences. Though in some ways he was a follower of Aristotle, his thought had other, and perhaps more decisive, influences. The present book is mainly a study of Hartmann's *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, with amplifications taken from some of his other writings. The author's method is to present a phase or part of Hartmann's thought (in the odd-numbered chapters), and then to follow it with a critical evaluation (in the even-numbered chapters). The author's point of view in this criticism is to adopt Hartmann's realism up to a point; that is, insofar as this realism can be combined with elements from Heidegger and Scheler. There seem to be affinities with—maybe even outright dependence on—Neoplatonism. The point cannot be easily decided since there is no documentation.

The translation is labored and sometimes reflects too closely an involved German idiom and lengthy technical terms. There is an index.

- SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress*. Rev. one-volume ed. in collaboration with Daniel Cory. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1954. Pp. viii + 504. \$6.50.

*The Life of Reason* (originally published in five volumes in 1905-6) has been considered by many the chief work of Santayana and is widely regarded as one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy. The present abridgement and revision was begun in 1951, and all the major work was completed before the author's death. The revision, the author informs us, was made not only in style, but in thought as well; and Mr. Cory tells us that a sustained effort was made to dispel the "mists of idealism from the realistic body of his philosophy" (p. vi). The realism, however, remains a realism of essence and matter.

- SCHRÖDINGER, ERWIN. *Nature and the Greeks*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; March, 1954. \$2.00.

- SCHWARTZ, CHARLENE. *Neurotic Anxiety*. New York: Sheed & Ward; April, 1954. \$2.50.

- Scientific Papers Presented to Max Born*. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1953. Pp. 100. \$2.50.

- SHELDON, WILMON H. *God and Polarity*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; April, 1954. \$8.00.

- SMITH, ALSON J. *Immortality*. New York: Prentice-Hall; Feb., 1954. \$3.00.

- STARKIE, ENID. *André Gide*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; May, 1954. \$2.50.

STERN, ALFRED. *Sartre, His Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*. New York: Liberal Arts Press. Pp. 245. \$4.50.

SULLIVAN, FRANK. *Sir Thomas More*. Los Angeles: Loyola Univ. of Los Angeles. Pp. 111. Paper, \$2.00.

TAYLOR, HAROLD. *On Education and Freedom*. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1954. Pp. 320. \$3.50.

This book is more of a series of essays than a monograph. The topics covered are moral values, the experience and teaching of art and the humanities, moral leadership and education, the function of a college president, the education of women, Communism, investigations and academic freedom, and philosophy.

The author's philosophy, though in one sense within the framework of Deweyism, is a lively, even passionate devotion to truth, and, to a lesser extent, to the rights of man and democracy. The book is interesting and provocative. At times, challenges seem to be made simply to arouse the reader.

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*. Vol. I: *God*. Tr., with introd. and notes, by Anton C. Pegis. New York: Doubleday & Co., fall, 1954.

THOMAS, HENRY, and DANA, LEE. *Living Adventures in Philosophy*. Garden City: Hanover House; March, 1954. \$2.95.

THURSTON, HERBERT, S.J. *Ghosts and Poltergeists*. Ed. by J. H. Crehan, S.J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954. Pp. ix + 210. \$4.00.

The late Father Thurston had published a number of studies on various unusual phenomena in many magazines and newspapers. The studies concerned with the present subject are here gathered and published for the first time. The author was extremely well acquainted with this field, and he is noted for his careful and cautious approach to the evidence and to the conclusions which might be drawn from them. He concludes that the facts are too well established in some instances to admit of reasonable doubt, that some agency not belonging to our sensible universe is at work, but that the particular nature of these agents is uncertain.

There is an index of names and places.

TRUEBLOOD, ELWYN JUDSON. *The Dawn of the Post-Modern Era*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. xii + 198. \$3.75.

The author is professor of religion and philosophy at Limestone College (Gaffney, S.C.). The present work may be broadly classified as in the field of philosophy of religion. The author is interested in pointing out changes in our view of the world and in social institutions, which will or should take place in the future. The Christianity proposed seems to tend toward liberal interpretation; the philosophy is typified by allusions to Aldous Huxley, H. A. Overstreet, A. N. Whitehead, and Albert Schweitzer.

USHENKO, ANDREW PAUL. *Dynamics of Art*. Foreword by Stephen C. Pepper. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; June, 1954. Pp. xiii + 257. \$5.00; Paper, \$3.75.

WANLASS, LAWRENCE C. *Gettell's History of Political Thought*. 2d ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. Pp. 430. \$5.00.

WARNOCK, G. J. *Berkeley*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 252. Paper, 50¢

This book is an introduction to the writings of Bishop Berkeley. The writings are taken up in chronological order, and one or more chapters are devoted to the exposition of the ideas treated therein. There is a rather brief index.

- WATKIN, E. I. *The Bow in the Clouds*. Reprint. New York: Sheed & Ward; March, 1954. \$2.50.
- "We Hold These Truths . . ." Report on Civil Liberties, January 1951-June 1953. New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1953. Pp. 160. Paper, apply.
- WRIGHT, ARTHUR F. (ed.). *Studies in Chinese Thought*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. 331. \$4.00.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- AUGUSTINE, ST. *Confessions*. Tr. by Vernon J. Bourke. New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1953. Pp. xxxii + 481. \$5.00.
- Bibliographie blondélienne, 1888-1951*. Under the direction of André Hayen, S.J. Bruxelles: L'édition universelle; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953. Pp. 93. Paper.
- BLACKHURST, J. HERBERT. *Body-Mind and Creativity*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1954. Pp. 186. \$3.00.
- BONAVENTURA, ST. *The Mind's Road to God*. Tr. with an introd. by George Boas. "The Library of Liberal Arts," No. 32. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. Pp. xxi + 46. Paper, 50¢
- BROWN, KENNETH IRVING. *Not Minds Alone. Some Frontiers of Christian Education*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1954. Pp. xv + 206. \$3.00.
- Catholic Year 1954, The*. Prepared by The National Council of Catholic Men. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1953. \$2.95.
- COPI, IRVING M. *Symbolic Logic*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1954. Pp. xiii + 355. \$5.00.
- CROMBIE, A. C. *Augustine to Galileo. The History of Science, A.D. 400-1650*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xv + 436. \$8.00.
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